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Articles
A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Buyers'
Competitive Conduct
THOMAS A. PIRAINO, JR.*
I. A NEW APPROACH TO BUYERS' EXERCISE OF MARKET POWER
A. THE COURTS' DILEMMA IN ANALYZING BUYERS' CONDUCT
This Article proposes a new means of regulating buyers' exercise of
market power under the federal antitrust laws. The federal courts
urgently need to adopt such an approach. In recent years, buyers have
increased their market power in retail, health care, manufacturing and
entertainment markets, and they have used their power to put their rivals
out of business and to force suppliers to sell to them at below-market
prices. As a result, an increasing number of firms are filing antitrust suits
challenging buyers' alleged anti-competitive conduct.' Unfortunately,
however, the federal courts have not yet been able to determine, on a
* Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary, Parker Hannifin Corporation, Cleveland,
Ohio. Distinguished Adjunct Lecturer, Case Western University School of Law. J.D., Cornell Law
School, 1974. The opinions expressed in this Article are personal to the Author and do not reflect the
opinions of Parker Hannifin Corporation.
i. See Michael C. Naughton, Buyer Power Under Attack: Recent Trends in Monopsony Cases,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2004, at 81 ("The growing number of cases being brought alleging violations of
the antitrust laws based upon abuse of buyer.., power may signal a developing trend."); Scott
Kilman, Tyson Loses Cattle-Price Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2004, at A3 (stating that "the growing
level of concentration in everything from cigarette manufacturing to blueberry processing is sparking a
wave of private [antitrust] litigation."). A federal jury in Alabama recently found Tyson Foods liable
for $1.28 billion in damages for using its market power to force down the price of cattle. See Kilman,
supra (describing Tyson Foods case).
Maurice Clarett, a sophomore running back at Ohio State University, sued the NFL, claiming
that the league violated the Sherman Act by using its market power to prevent players less than three
years from high school from playing in the NFL. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F-3d 124 (2d Cit. 2004). Plaintiffs
in a large class action case have claimed that all the non-governmental teaching hospitals in the United
States conspired to reduce the salaries paid to medical school graduates. The class could ultimately
include as many as 200,000 plaintiffs and involve billions of dollars in damages. See Tanya Ott.,




consistent basis, which competitive conduct of buyers should be
permitted or precluded.
The courts' difficulty stems from the fact that the conduct of large
buyers has both adverse and beneficial economic effects. In a recent
interview in the New York Times, Lawrence Bossidy, the former chief
executive of Honeywell, described the "emergence of the power retailers,
the Home Depots, the Wal-Marts, the Lowes, who on the one hand have
given consumers better prices.., but on the other hand, they've
displaced a lot of businesses."' The divergent effects of Wal-Mart's
market power illustrate the courts' dilemma in regulating buyers'
conduct. Wal-Mart is now the largest company in the world, controlling
8.5% of all non-automotive retail sales in the United States and even
larger portions of particular retail segments.3 Wal-Mart is such a
significant outlet for most of its suppliers that they cannot afford to
ignore its demands.4 Wal-Mart has the ability to affect its suppliers in
beneficial as well as adverse ways. Wal-Mart relentlessly forces its
suppliers to lower their prices, making them more efficient producers.
Consumers benefit directly from Wal-Mart's supplier relationships
because Wal-Mart passes on its cost savings to its customers. Indeed,
Wal-Mart saves American consumers billions of dollars each year and
allows many Americans to purchase products they otherwise could not
have afforded Wal-Mart has become such a significant factor in the
retail economy that its lower prices have helped to reduce the over-all
inflation rate in the United States.6
2. William J. Holstein, First Corporate Scandals, Then Tough Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2004, at BU9.
3. Wal-Mart had nearly $260 billion in sales in 2o03, surpassing producers such as ExxonMobil,
General Motors, Ford, and General Electric. See Wal-Mart Tops Fortune 5oo List, CHATTANOOGA
TIMES FREE PRESS, Mar. 23, 2004, at C2. In 2004, Wal-Mart is expected to have sales of approximately
$30o billion, which would be four times the sales of the next-largest retailer in the United States. Ann
Zimmerman, Wal-Mart Loses Discount Edge in Sluggish Early Holiday Sales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30,
2004, at Ai (describing Wal-Mart's 8.5% share of the U.S. non-automotive retail market). Wal-Mart's
share of specific retail segments is even greater. For example, "More than 30 percent of the disposable
diapers purchased in the country are sold in Wal-Mart stores, as are 30 percent of hair-care products,
26 percent of toothpaste and 2o percent of pet food." Steve Lohr, Is Wal-Mart Good for America?,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at WKI.
4. See John R. Wilke, Bully Buyers: How Driving Prices Lower Can Violate Antitrust Statutes,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2004, at At ("The world's largest retailer has enormous power to squeeze
suppliers, who have repeatedly asked regulators to rein it in.").
5. For examples of how Wal-Mart benefits consumers, see id. ("[M]any economists see Wal-
Mart as an example of how buyer power can benefit consumers."). Supporters argue that Wal-Mart "is
an agent of economic virtue, using its market power to force suppliers to become more efficient and
passing the gains on to consumers as lower prices." Lohr, supra note 3. One hundred forty million
shoppers visit Wal-Mart every week to take advantage of low prices that save Americans an estimated
$ioo billion per year. Jerry Heaster, Wal-Mart is Driven by Consumers, KANSAS CITY STAR, Dec. 17,
2003.
6. When Wal-Mart enters a local market, it drives down retail prices in the entire area, forcing
other stores to perform more efficiently and to implement their own low-price policies. See Shelley
[VOL. 56: 12I11122
BUYERS' COMPETITIVE CONDUCT
There is, however, a dark side to the Wal-Mart story. Many of Wal-
Mart's suppliers have been forced out of business because of their
inability to make a reasonable profit.7 The surviving suppliers are often
forced either to move their production facilities off-shore or to limit their
investment in domestic production. In order to meet Wal-Mart's
constant demands for lower prices, many of Wal-Mart's suppliers impose
their own cost-cutting demands on their suppliers, thus multiplying
profitability problems for firms further upstream in the production
process.9 The profitability squeeze may force suppliers to reduce their
domestic output of goods and services, ultimately harming consumers.
As one commentator recently explained, "producers will stop innovating,
or producing at all, if they can't get a fair price."'"
Branch, Tough Sale: Long Used to Getting Full Price, A Retailer Faces New Pressures, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 3, 2004, at AI ("Ever since the explosion of low-price formats such as Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and
Target Corp. in the 199os, stores of every stripe have fired back with an ever-expanding number of
sales."). Wal-Mart's success derives not only from its enhanced bargaining power with suppliers, but
also from its own internal efficiency. Wal-Mart has developed sophisticated information management
and distribution logistic systems that allow it to match its inventory with consumer demand. These
systems constantly monitor consumer purchases and inventory levels and instantly communicate to
Wal-Mart's suppliers and distribution centers the specific amount of product required to replenish
stocks at particular stores. This "just-in-time" inventory system minimizes Wal-Mart's costs while
ensuring adequate quantities of the products its customers want. See Steve Lohr, Questioning the Age
of Wal-Mart, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2003, at WK5 ("[Wal-Mart] has been a pioneer in using the tools of
information technology to track every purchase, every shipment of supplies, every cost of doing
business, minute by minute, around the world.").
7. See Lohr, supra note 3.
8. See id. ("To keep cutting costs, Wal-Mart is tough on its suppliers. Selling to Wal-Mart, by all
accounts, is a brutal meritocracy. Manufacturers have been forced to lay off workers after Wal-Mart
canceled orders when another vendor cut its price a few cents more. Other suppliers have shifted to
low-cost operations in China and elsewhere when squeezed by Wal-Mart to cut costs further.").
9. Wal-Mart's actions have exacerbated a profitability problem for suppliers already adversely
affected by the capacity over-hang from the late 199os. See Wilke, supra note 4. As one commentator
has concluded, "In a world that produces so much more than people are willing to buy-even avid
consumers-price cutting became the only option [for American manufacturers]." Louis Uchitelle,
Wild Card of the Recovery: Inflation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, at BU4. Prices for durable goods, for
example, declined in each of the years between 1996 and 2002. See Stephen S. Roach, The Costs of
Bursting Bubbles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, at WKI3. Although falling prices may provide a short-
term boon to consumers in excess capacity industries, the long-term economic trends in such markets
are usually adverse to consumers. If prices sink too low, producers will not earn sufficient profits to
fund capital investments in machinery, computers, and other tools of production. See Uchitelle, supra.
Indeed, robust capital investment is critical to maintaining gains in productivity, which is "the single
most important factor affecting our economic well-being." Willow A. Shermata, Barriers to
Innovation: A Monopoly, Network Externalities, and the Speed of Innovation, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 937,
937 (I997) (quoting PAUL KRUGMAN, THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS: ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE
1990s 17 (199o)); see also Louis Uchitelle, Notions of New Economy Hinge on Pace of Productivity
Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2001, at At ("Productivity is the principal contributor to economic
growth.").
so. Wilke, supra note 4. If producers are forced by large buyers such as Wal-Mart to lower their
prices below the normal competitive level for a significant period of time, they will be forced to reduce
the salaries and benefits of their employees and to move manufacturing jobs off-shore. The loss of
well-paying manufacturing jobs has harmed the U.S. economy. See Erika Kinetz, Who Wins and Who
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Nor are the adverse effects of Wal-Mart's market power limited to
the upstream supply level. Wal-Mart's size also, gives it the ability to
harm its competitors at the retail level. Wal-Mart's strategy has the effect
of saturating local markets with low prices and putting small, locally-
owned stores (which lack its ability to pressure suppliers for lower prices)
out of business. Many of those stores have traditionally provided a higher
level of customer service than Wal-Mart. Thus, consumers in small towns
may be left with no alternative other than Wal-Mart's low-overhead, low-
service approach."
B. A NEW APPROACH TO REGULATING BUYERS' CONDUCT
The courts need to adopt a new antitrust approach that not only
encourages large buyers to reduce consumer prices but also deters them
from harming their suppliers and their rivals at the retail level. The
federal courts are currently ill-equipped to deal with the problems posed
by the market power of large buyers. Buyers' market power has
traditionally been de-emphasized by antitrust regulators, who have been
most concerned with the misuse of market power by sellers of goods and
services. 2 Until recently, there have been few cases challenging the
conduct of large buyers. The rare cases that have reached the courts have
been litigated under out-of-date, formalistic rules that fail to consider the
substantive economic effects of buyers' conduct. Lacking a consistent
Loses as Jobs Move Overseas?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at BU5 (describing how workers displaced
from manufacturing jobs must "take an average wage cut of 13 to 14 percent" in their new jobs).
Declines in manufacturing employment reduce over-all consumer demand in the United States and
limit the economy's potential for expansion. See Louis Uchitelle, A Recovery for Profits, But Not for
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at BU4 (explaining slow wage growth in current economy and
consequent decline in demand); Louis Uchitelle, As Stimulus, Tax Cuts May Soon Go Awry, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20. 2003, at BU4 ("[Wlhen it comes to lifting the economy, seventy years of experience
has demonstrated that rising demand is crucial, and must come first.").
ii. See Sharon Zukin, We Are Where We Shop, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2003, at A43. One
commentator has argued that "Wal-Mart points the way to a grim Darwinian world of bankrupt
competitors, low wages, meager health benefits, jobs lost to imports, and devastated down-towns and
rural areas across America." Lohr, supra note 3. Ultimately, Wal-Mart may be able to harm even its
large retail competitors. Indeed, K-Mart and FAO Schwartz have already been forced into
bankruptcy, and Toys R Us has been forced to reorganize its operations, as a result of an inability to
compete with Wal-Mart. See Michael Barbaro, Toys R Us Restructuring, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2004, at
E-i; Susan Chandler, K-Mart Files for Chapter iI, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23, 2oo2, at i; Queena Sook Kim,
Storied FAO is Casualty of Tough Holiday Toy-Pricing War, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, at Bi
(describing FAO Schwartz bankruptcy).
12. In cases brought under Section I of the Sherman Act, the federal courts have precluded
sellers from conspiring to fix prices, allocate territories, or otherwise restrict competition among
themselves. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaborations Among
Competitors, 86 IowA L. REv. 1137, 1144-45 (2001) [hereinafter Piraino, Collaborations Among
Competitors] (describing Supreme Court's traditional approach to such arrangements). Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, the courts have prohibited monopoly suppliers from unilaterally exercising their
market power to foreclose other firms from entering the relevant supply market. See Thomas A.
Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 809,
828-44 (2000) (describing principal monopolization cases).
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economic theory to explain buyers' conduct, the courts have produced a
series of conflicting and confusing opinions.'3
There is a basis for regulating the conduct of large buyers under
Sections i and 2 of the Sherman Act.'" On the buying side, "monopsony"
power constitutes the equivalent of a selling side monopoly, I" and a
buyer's unilateral exercise of such power may be illegal under Section 2.
A buyer possesses monopsony power when it purchases all or most of the
supply of a particular product or service.16 Commentators have argued
that it should be illegal for a monopsony buyer to use its market power to
reduce the prices paid to its suppliers to a point below the normal
competitive level.'7 Instead of unilaterally exercising their market power,
a group of buyers may join together and demand a lower price from their
suppliers. Just as monopsony describes a buyer's monopoly, the term
"oligopsony" describes the buying-side equivalent of "oligopoly" at the
selling level. A sales oligopoly exists when a small number of firms
controls most of the market for the sale of a particular product or
service.' Oligopsony power occurs when a few firms, collectively
controlling a significant share of the market for the purchase of a
particular product, act in concert to reduce the price of that product.'9
Like conspiracies among oligopolists, agreements among oligopsonists
may be illegal under Section i of the Sherman Act."
This Article proposes a new antitrust approach that will clarify the
standards of legality for monopsony and oligopsony conduct. For
decades, the courts have been hamstrung in antitrust cases by a false
assumption that competitive conduct must be analyzed under one of two
completely opposite approaches. Under the "per se rule," the courts
classified certain restraints as inherently anti-competitive. Once a
restraint was placed in the per se category, courts invalidated it without
any further consideration. In price-fixing cases, for example, the courts
refused to consider defendants' justifications for their conduct or any
13. See infra notes 32-90 and accompanying text.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000); see Jonathan M. Jacobson & Gary J. Dorman, Joint Purchasing,
Monopsony, and Antitrust, 36 ANT TRUsT BULL. I, 24 (i99I) (describing cases).
15. See Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Monopsony as an Agency and Regulatory Problem
in Health Care, 71 ANTRUsT L.J. 949, 963 (2004) ("A monopsonist is simply a monopoly buyer rather
than a monopoly seller .... Graphically, monopsony problems appear identical to monopoly
problems-only upside down and backwards."); Kilman, supra note i (stating that "monopsony... is
the mirror image of monopoly").
16. See James Murphy Dowd, Oligopsony Power: Antitrust Injury and Collusive Buyer Practices
in Input Markets, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1075, io84 (1996).
17. See id. at io85 n.36.
18. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 9, 9 (2004).
i9. See Dowd, supra note 16, at io84; Naughton, supra note i, at 87 n.i ("Oligopsony is an input
market characterized by few buyers.").
20. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
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circumstances affecting competition in the relevant market.' However,
courts took a completely different approach to any restraints that did not
fit into the per se pigeonhole. The "rule of reason" applied to all
restraints that were not considered inherently anti-competitive. Under
the rule of reason, the courts opened the door for an exhaustive inquiry
into all circumstances that might conceivably explain the economic
effects of the restraint at issue, including the nature of competition in the
relevant market, the share of that market held by each of the competitors
therein, and the parties' reasons for implementing the restraint.22 The per
se rule and the rule of reason were so diametrically opposed that a
court's decision to apply one rule or the other usually determined the
outcome of a case.23 In order to prevail in a per se action, plaintiffs only
had to prove that a defendant engaged in the relevant conduct. However,
because proof of relevant market circumstances is so difficult, "even truly
anti-competitive conduct usually escapes condemnation in full rule of
reason cases." 4 The rule of reason, in fact, has been viewed as "a
euphemism for an endless economic inquiry resulting in a defense
verdict.""5
Beginning in the early 199os, this Author argued that the federal
courts should abandon the per se/rule of reason dichotomy in favor of a
"sliding scale" approach, under which they would vary their degree of
inquiry in Sherman Act cases depending upon the likely competitive
26effects of the conduct at issue. In its most recent case interpreting
21. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 1io (1984) ("We have never
required proof of market power in ... a [price-fixing] case."); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, 446 U.S.
643,649 (i98o) (refusing to consider defendants' arguments that price restraints promote new entry).
22. The open-ended formulation of the rule of reason was first described by the Supreme Court
in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (i918), and has been repeated in several
more recent Supreme Court decisions. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723
(1988) (describing the rule of reason approach); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 49 n. 15 (1977) (citing Justice Brandeis' statement of the rule of reason).
23. As the FTC has stated:
[T]he Supreme Court appeared to discern a sharp dichotomy between per se and
reasonableness analysis-between summary condemnation (in which plaintiffs often
prevailed if an agreement was proven) and an abyss of reasonableness analysis (from which
defendants routinely emerged unscathed). The Court's cases in this era reflected little sense
that there were manageable alternatives between the poles.
In re Polygram Holding, Inc. [hereinafter "Polygram"], F.T.C. No. 9298, slip op., at 16 (July 24, 2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo3/o7/polygramopinion.pdf.
24. Marina Lao, Comment, The Rule of Reason and Horizontal Restraints Involving
Professionals, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 499, 504 (2000). Professors Areeda, Hovenkamp and Blair have
pointed out that defining the relevant market in a rule of reason case is "often one of the most costly
elements in antitrust litigation." PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW I 305(e), at 53-54 (2d ed.
2000).
25. Maxwell M. Blecher, Schwinn-An Example of a Genuine Commitment to Antitrust Law, 44
ANTITRUST L.J. 550,553 (1975).
26. See Piraino, Collaborations Among Competitors, supra note 12, at 1137; Thomas A. Piraino,
Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section i of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L.
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Section i of the Sherman Act, California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 7 the
Supreme Court, citing the work of this Author and of other antitrust
commentators, endorsed a similar type of analysis. s California Dental
has been called a "major anti-trust event" and may constitute a
watershed in the Court's approach to the Sherman Act. 9 Under
California Dental, the federal courts no longer need to choose between
the extremes of the per se rule and the rule of reason." Instead, they can
view Sherman Act analysis as a continuum, under which the degree of
analysis will depend upon the relevant circumstances of the conduct at
issue.
Consistent with California Dental, this Article proposes that the
federal courts use approaches specifically tailored to the likely
competitive effects of the three main types of buyer conduct: oligopsony
pricing, induced discrimination, and monopsony pricing.' Each of these
types of conduct can be placed on a continuum according to the degree
of analysis necessary to determine its legality. Oligopsony pricing
involves conspiracies among buyers to offer identical prices to common
suppliers. Since the only effects of oligopsony pricing are to eliminate
competition on input prices, the courts can condemn such conduct on its
face. Induced discrimination occurs when a retailer complains to a
supplier about a competing retailer's price or service, and the supplier
responds to the complaints by cutting off sales to the offending retailer or
continuing to sell to the retailer on discriminatory terms. Cases of
REV. 1753 (1994) [hereinafter Piraino, Making Sense]; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se
and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685 (i99I) [hereinafter
Piraino, Reconciling Approaches].
27. 526 U.S. 756 (I99).
28. Id. at 78o-8i (citing William J. Kolasky, Counterpoint: The Department of Justice's "Stepwise"
Approach Imposes Too Heavy a Burden on Parties to Horizontal Agreements, ATITRUST 41, 43,
Spring 1998; Piraino, Making Sense, supra note 26, at 177I).
29. Charles D. Weller, A "New" Rule of Reason from Justice Brandeis' "Concentric Circles" and
Other Changes in Law, 44 ANTiTRusT BULL. 88I, 949 (1999).
30. The Court pointed out that "[w]hat is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case" and
thus "the quality of proof required ... should vary with the circumstances." Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at
78o-8I (quoting AREEDA, ANTrrRUST LAW 1507, at 402 (1986)).
31. In rare cases, large buyers may engage in other types of conduct that can be illegal under the
antitrust laws. A monopsonist could, for example, engage in predatory conduct designed to keep
competing buyers out of its market and preserve its monopsony power. See Jacobson & Dorman,
supra note 14, at 5 ("If entry into the monopsonist's market is impeded or delayed, monopsony profits
may persist over time."). Just as a monopolist can reduce its prices below its costs to discourage entry,
a monopsonist could increase the prices it paid to suppliers in order to raise the costs of its actual or
potential rivals. For a short time, the monopsonist could afford to pay a price that would force it to
incur losses. After a rival was driven out of the market or was convinced not to attempt entry into the
market, the monopsonist could recoup its losses by forcing a supplier to lower its prices below the
competitive level. For example, in In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, the plaintiffs alleged that a
purchaser of cattle attempted to drive its competitors out of the market "by paying a higher price for
fed cattle than the market suggested." 9o7 F.2d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 199o). Such pricing practices by a
monopsonist should be no less illegal than a monopolist's below-cost predatory pricing.
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induced discrimination require a more detailed inquiry than oligopsony
pricing because the courts must confirm the purpose of the supplier's
conduct. The courts should permit discriminatory actions undertaken by
suppliers for legitimate independent reasons, while they should preclude
actions with no purpose other than to accede to retailers' desire to limit
competition among themselves. Finally, the courts should reserve their
most detailed analysis for cases of monopsony pricing, which of all buyer
conduct is most likely to benefit consumers. In monopsony pricing cases,
large buyers use their bargaining leverage to obtain substantial discounts
from their suppliers. In many cases, buyers pass along the benefits of
such discounts to consumers. The courts should only preclude
monopsony pricing when it is clear that the adverse effects on suppliers
are not outweighed by the benefits of lower consumer prices.
The proposed approach will prevent anti-competitive conduct and
encourage efficiency-enhancing behavior. Large buyers will be deterred
from participating in oligopsony pricing conspiracies that stabilize input
prices. In induced discrimination cases, suppliers will retain their
incentive to take actions against buyers that enhance the efficiency of
their distribution systems, while large buyers will be deterred from
attempting to convince suppliers to take discriminatory actions against
their rivals. Finally, large buyers will be encouraged to engage in the
types of aggressive price negotiations that ultimately reduce consumer
prices.
Part II of this Article describes the deficiencies in the courts' current
approach to buyers' competitive conduct. Part III explains the proposed
new means of analyzing buyers' behavior. Parts IV, V and VI
demonstrate how the proposed approach can be used to analyze
oligopsony pricing, induced discrimination, and monopsony pricing,
respectively.
II. DEFICIENCIES IN THE COURTS' CURRENT APPROACH TO
BUYER CONDUCT
In cases involving oligopsony pricing, induced discrimination, and
monopsony pricing, the federal courts have failed to consider the
substantive economic effects of buyers' conduct. Having long assumed
that they must choose between a harsh per se rule and a permissive rule
of reason, the courts have resorted to formalistic means of distinguishing
between acceptable and illegal behavior. As a result, the cases dealing
with buyers' conduct are inconsistent and confusing, and they offer little
guidance to firms attempting to comply with the antitrust laws.
A. OLIGOPSONY PRICING CASES
Oligopsony pricing occurs when a group of buyers agree to engage in
joint purchasing negotiations and to offer a common purchase price to
[VOL. 56: 112 1
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their suppliers.3" One commentary has pointed out that "[t]he antitrust
treatment of joint purchasing arrangements is surprisingly confused and
uncertain."33 Traditionally, the courts used a per se approach for
oligopsony pricing, but recent cases have adopted a rule of reason
analysis.
The Supreme Court's 1948 decision in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc.
v. American Crystal Sugar Co.4 involved an agreement among the sugar
refiners in Northern California to pay a uniform price to the growers of
sugar beets in the area. The defendants argued that the per se rule
against price-fixing should not apply because the agreement to fix prices
was among purchasers rather than suppliers and harmed sellers rather
than consumers.35 The Court, however, concluded that a per se approach
was appropriate because the anti-competitive effects of the buyers'
arrangement were no less serious than those of a price-fixing agreement
by sellers.36 In the 1965 case, National Macaroni Manufacturers Ass'n v.
FTC,37 the principal domestic manufacturers of macaroni products
specified that they would no longer purchase one hundred percent
durum wheat for their products; instead, they would only purchase a
blend of durum and other types of wheat. The purpose of the agreement
was to reduce the demand, and hence the price, for durum wheat. The
Seventh Circuit found the agreement among the defendants to be a per
se illegal price-fixing arrangement.39
A 1985 Supreme Court case cast doubt on whether buyers' joint
negotiation of purchase prices should continue to be per se illegal. In
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,4
the Supreme Court concluded that the membership restrictions of a
purchasing cooperative should be analyzed under the rule of reason.'
The Court emphasized that purchasing joint ventures had beneficial
32. See In Re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 907 F.2d at 515 (stating that an oligopsonist "could
form an alliance with other oligopsonists in the relevant market and attempt to depress prices and
increase profits").
33. Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 14, at 2.
34. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
35. Id. at 242-43.
36. Id. at 235-36.
37. 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
38. Id. at 423.
39. Id. at 426-27. In a recent case, Bellevue Drug Co. v. Advance PCS, 2004 WL 72449o, at *6
(E.D. Pa. 2004), a court refused to dismiss a Section I complaint alleging that sponsors of prescription
drug benefit plans conspired through a prescription benefit manager to fix the prices of prescription
drugs that they purchased from retail pharmacies. Citing Mandeville, the court concluded that "a
price-suppression scheme effected by a group of buyers, who would otherwise compete with one
another for goods sold by a seller, constitutes a restraint of trade." Id.
40. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
4. Id. at 295 (stating that purchasing joint ventures "are not a form of concerted activity




competitive effects, such as allowing their partners to "achieve
economies of scale in both the purchase and warehousing of wholesale
supplies."42 Although the Court did not discuss buyers' joint negotiation
of purchase prices, the members of a purchasing joint venture could
argue that such negotiations allow them to achieve economies of scale
and cost savings. Thus, under the Court's rationale in Northwest
Wholesale, the rule of reason should also be used to analyze such
conduct.
A rule of reason analysis of oligopsony pricing will likely leave large
buyers confused as to the applicable standards of conduct because the
courts have never defined the parameters of the rule. Indeed, the courts
have used several variations of the rule of reason. Under the traditional
version of the rule, courts have required plaintiffs to prove that
competition in the relevant market as a whole was harmed as a result of a
defendant's actions. This approach requires a fact-finder to define a
market and to inquire into all the market circumstances surrounding the
restraint at issue, including the defendants' market power.43 However,
under other versions of the rule, such as the "quick look," the courts
have relieved plaintiffs of the obligation to prove defendants' market
power and have shifted the burden to defendants to demonstrate pro-
competitive justifications for a restraint on competition." Thus, antitrust
practitioners and business executives cannot be certain of how
competitive conduct will be analyzed when courts opt for a rule of reason
approach.4"
42. Id.
43. The classic formulation of the rule of reason, set forth by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board
of Trade v. United States, includes such factors as the circumstances peculiar to the defendant's
business, the conditions before and after the restraint, the nature and purpose of the restraint, and the
competitive effects of the restraint. See 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Subsequent Supreme Court cases
have failed to refine this open-ended formula. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 49 n.15 (1977), for example, the Court cited Justice Brandeis' formulation without indicating the
relevance or weight to be afforded any particular factor.
44. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
45. The case of United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658 (3rd Cir. 1993), illustrates the
confusion that can occur when the courts use the rule of reason to analyze buyers' conduct. In that
case, the Department of Justice claimed that a group of Ivy League colleges had engaged in an illegal
form of oligopsony pricing under Section i of the Sherman Act. Id. at 661. Each of the schools had
adopted an identical method of determining the amount of financial aid to be offered to disadvantaged
students. Id. at 662-63. The District Court, using the quick look version of the rule of reason, found
the arrangement illegal without considering certain of the schools' justifications. Id. at 664. The
schools argued that their agreement to standardize their approach to financial aid widened the pool of
potential applicants, thus increasing consumer choice. Id. The District Court concluded that the
schools' "social welfare justifications" should not be considered in its rule of reason analysis, because
they had no bearing on the economic effects of the schools' arrangement. Id. The Third Circuit
reversed the District Court, pointing out that the schools should have had the opportunity to
demonstrate the procompetitive justifications of the cooperative financial aid arrangement under a
"full-scale rule of reason analysis." Id. at 678.
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In truth, neither the per se rule nor the rule of reason constitutes an
appropriate approach to oligopsony conduct. The per se rule precludes
buyers from forming joint purchasing arrangements designed to enhance
their efficiency. A rule of reason approach, on the other hand, allows
defendants to introduce so many market factors that the outcome of
particular cases will become impossible to predict. If the courts mean to
clarify the antitrust standards for oligopsony pricing, they will have to
adopt an entirely different approach.
B. INDUCED DISCRIMINATION CASES
The issue of induced discrimination arises when a supplier
distributes its products to retailers that compete with each other in the
resale of the products. Retailers often complain to their supplier about a
competing retailer's prices or service. In certain cases, such complaints
include an implied or explicit request for the supplier to discipline the
offending retailer. A supplier may respond to the retailers' complaints
either by refusing to continue to sell to the offending retailer at all, or by
continuing to sell only on discriminatory terms.
i. Induced Refusals to Deal
An induced refusal to deal occurs when one or more buyers
convince a supplier to stop selling a product to one of the buyers' rivals.
The Supreme Court has adopted a formalistic approach to induced
discrimination cases. The Court has applied the per se rule when more
than one buyer has induced the refusal to deal, and a rule of reason
approach when only one buyer has convinced a supplier to stop selling to
a rival. There is no economic basis for this distinction. The effect on
competition is the same regardless of whether one or multiple buyers
induce a supplier not to deal with another buyer.
There has always been a consensus among antitrust scholars and the
federal courts that it should be per se illegal for a group of buyers to
conspire to induce a supplier not to deal with a competitor of the buyers.
Courts and commentators have viewed such conduct as a naked cartel
with no purpose other than the suppression of competition. Even Robert
Bork, one of the most influential commentators favoring a less aggressive
antitrust policy, has argued that firms' concerted action to exclude a
competitor from the market should be per se illegal.46 The Supreme
Court has consistently followed a per se approach in multiple
inducement cases. For example, in 1966, in United States v. General
Motors Corp.," the Court held that it was per se illegal for a group of
46. See ROBERT BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 335 (978) ("[Slince such behavior carries no
possible benefit to consumers, the law is probably correct in outlawing all naked boycotts, regardless
of their prospects for success.").
47. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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automobile dealers to induce General Motors not to sell to automobile
discount houses.45
There is also Supreme Court precedent for applying the per se rule
when a single buyer induces a supplier not to deal with a competitor. The
principal Supreme Court case, Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,4
involved a single department store that was able to induce ten household
appliance manufacturers not to sell, or to sell only at discriminatory
prices, to a competing department store. The Court held that the
department store's conduct was per se illegal."
Some lower federal courts followed the Supreme Court's lead in
Klor's and applied the per se rule when a single buyer induced
discriminatory treatment of a competitor." Other federal courts,
however, refused to apply the per se rule when a single buyer was
involved. In Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,5 for example, Sears
Roebuck Co. convinced Whirlpool to stop selling vacuum cleaners to a
small distributor that competed with Sears in the resale market. The
court held that the per se rule could not apply because there was no
horizontal plurality, that is, two or more defendants at the resale level.53
Two recent Supreme Court cases have resolved this conflict in the
circuit courts and concluded that there must be a horizontal conspiracy
among more than one firm in order for buyer-induced discrimination to
be per se illegal. In 1988, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
48. See id. at 146-47. For lower court cases following a similar approach, see JTC Petroleum Co.
v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 19o F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999) (paving contractors conspired to induce
suppliers of asphalt not to deal with another contractor); Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3 d 452
(3d Cir. 1998) (several roofing distributors pressured their suppliers not to sell to new entrant into
roofing business); Denny's Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3 d 1217 (7th Cir. 1993) (competing
boat show dealers complained to boat show producers about admission of discounting dealer); Big
Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1992) (per se illegality of
combination among BMW dealers to persuade company to reject firm's application for new
dealership).
49. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
50. Id. at 211-13.
51. See Zidell Explorations Inc. v. Conval Int'l, Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (valve
distributor induced foreign manufacturer to terminate competitor); Alloy Int'l Co. v. Hoover-NSK
Bearing Co., Inc., 635 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 198o) (bearing distributor terminated at request of
competitor); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3 d Cir. 1979) (retailer of kitchen
cabinets convinced cabinet manufacturer to terminate a competing retailer); Sport Shoe of Newark,
Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 921 (D. Del. 1981) (shoe retailer induced supplier not to
sell to new retailer at nearby location). In Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, the Seventh Circuit upheld an
FTC decision that Toys "R" Us violated Section 5 of the FTC Act when it organized a conspiracy
among its toy suppliers not to do business, or to do business on less favorable terms, with the retail
competitors of Toys "R" Us. 221 F.3d 928, 937-38 (7th Cir. 2000).
52. 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc).
53. Id. at 131-32. Several other federal circuit courts have adopted an approach similar to Oreck
and denied application of the per se rule when only one buyer allegedly induced a rival's termination.
See, e.g., Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l Inc., 796 F.2d 1216 (Ioth Cir. 1986); Packard Motor
Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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Electronics Corp., the Court considered a manufacturer's termination of
a dealer that resold electronic calculators. Another dealer had
complained to the manufacturer on several occasions about the
terminated dealer's low prices. The complaining dealer gave the
manufacturer an ultimatum: it would cease doing business with it within
thirty days unless it terminated the other dealer." The manufacturer
responded to the threat by terminating the other dealer within the thirty-
day period.56 The Court refused to find the manufacturer's conduct per se
illegal.57 The Court emphasized that, "since price cutting and some
measure of service cutting usually go hand in hand,"' 8 manufacturers
often have legitimate reasons for terminating price-cutting dealers. Thus
a per se approach would deter manufacturers from disciplining price-
cutting dealers that are not effectively promoting the resale of their
products. The Court distinguished earlier per se cases such as General
Motors on the ground that they "involved horizontal combinations,"
meaning combinations of more than one firm at some competitive level,
while Sharp involved only one manufacturer and a single dealer. The
Court found Klor's inapplicable, stating that Klor's involved not a
"vertical" agreement between a supplier and a customer but a
"horizontal" agreement among the ten competing appliance
manufacturers, all of whom agreed to discriminate against the plaintiff. 
6
In Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,6" the Court declined to apply a per se
analysis to a decision by a local telephone company to switch from one
supplier to another. The Court characterized the agreement between the
company and its new supplier as a "vertical restraint.",6' The Court
distinguished Klor's, pointing out: "Although Klor's involved a threat
made by a single powerful firm, it also involved a horizontal agreement
among those threatened, namely, the appliance suppliers, to hurt a
competitor of the retailer who made the threat."
63
The Supreme Court mischaracterized Klor's in its decisions in Sharp
and Nynex. It is true that Klor's involved an agreement by several
appliance makers not to sell to a department store. However, the real
evil perceived by the Supreme Court in Klor's was not the conspiracy
among the appliance manufacturers; rather, it was the ability of the
single department store to induce the appliance manufacturers to
54. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
55. Id. at 727.
56. Id. at 721.
57. Id. at 727-28.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 734
6o. Id.
6I. 525 U.S. 128 (I998).
62. Id. at 128.
63. Id. at 135.
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discriminate against a competing store.64 Indeed, there was no
independent reason for the appliance makers to conspire to exclude the
plaintiff from the resale appliance market. Each appliance maker had a
motive to conspire on a vertical basis with the inducing department store
because no manufacturer wanted to lose the store's business. However,
the appliance makers had no rational reason to conspire with each other
to eliminate the plaintiff as a competitor. As one commentator has
explained, "[The appliance makers'] interests do not lie in reducing
competition at the adjacent level of the market. In the ordinary course,
suppliers do not want to help one customer become a monopolist in that
downstream market ... ,,65 Thus, in Klor's, "the idea of a horizontal
conspiracy among the appliance manufacturers was a phantom.... 66
The Supreme Court should have recognized in Sharp and Nynex
that, in an induced discrimination case, the number of conspirators at
each level of the supply chain has no economic relevance. What matters
is a supplier's motive for ceasing to do business with a buyer. Regardless
of whether one or more buyers complain about a rival's prices or other
competitive conduct, a supplier should be permitted to discipline dealers
for its own legitimate reasons, but it should not be permitted merely to
knuckle under to its buyers' anti-competitive demands to exclude a rival
from the market. As Justice Stevens pointed out, citing this Author in his
dissent in Sharp, the relevant inquiry in induced discrimination cases is
"'to insure that a manufacturer's motive for a vertical restriction is not
simply to acquiesce in his distributors' desires to limit competition among
themselves."67
Once a fact-finder confirms that one or more buyers have induced
discriminatory conduct, the number of buyers effecting the inducement
has no competitive significance. The adverse competitive effect in
induced discrimination cases results from a buyer's ability to enlist the
supplier's participation in the conspiracy, not from the number of buyers
that originate the scheme. A termination induced by a single buyer can
adversely affect competition to the same extent as a termination induced
by a group of buyers. Indeed, a single large buyer may have a greater
ability to compel the supplier's participation than a group of smaller
buyers. If either one or several buyers are able to coerce a manufacturer
into proceeding with a termination, the resulting restriction of
competition justifies finding the conduct illegal without any further
64. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
65. Kenneth L. Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section i of the Sherman Act, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 33 (2002) (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 49.
67. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 750 n.14 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated Restrictions




The per se/rule of reason distinction adopted in Sharp and Nynex
has no economic validity in induced discrimination cases. Under the full
version of the rule of reason, the federal courts have required plaintiffs
to prove that the conduct at issue harmed competition in the relevant
market as a whole. 68 Entrepreneurial firms with small market shares may
not be able to demonstrate that competition in the entire relevant market
was substantially diminished as a result of their exclusion. If, for
example, Wal-Mart convinced a television manufacturer to stop dealing
with a nearby appliance retailer, the retailer might not be able to prove
an adverse effect on competition in the entire television retail market.
Under Sharp and Nynex, the terminated retailer could lose its claim on
summary judgment, even though it provided better services to consumers
than Wal-Mart. However, the retailer could have prevailed under a per
se theory if, instead of Wal-Mart, two small appliance stores induced the
television manufacturer to cut off sales to the retailer. The effect on
consumers is identical in these two examples, yet the antitrust outcome
would be completely different under the Supreme Court's current
approach.
2. The Price Discrimination Cases
While the Supreme Court has imposed too heavy a burden on
buyers in Sherman Act refusal-to-deal cases, it has made it too easy for
buyers to prevail in price discrimination cases brought under the
Robinson-Patman Act.69 Under Sharp, a buyer excluded from the market
as a result of the complaints of a single rival will have to prove that its
exclusion harmed competition in the market as a whole. In Robinson-
Patman cases, however, a disadvantaged buyer's burden is much lower.
The buyer merely has to prove that the supplier sold the same product at
a lower price to one of the buyer's competitors." Rarely will such a price
68. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
69. Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936 to protect small, independent retailers
from large retail chains, such as F.W. Woolworth and the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company,
which were then first gaining market power. Indeed, such retailers constituted the Wal-Mart of their
times. See Lohr, supra note 3 (describing Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company as "the Wal-Mart of
its time"). Like Wal-Mart, F.W. Woolworth was able to maintain low prices through economies of
scale and "ruthless cost cutting-using self service to reduce the number of sales clerks, paying them
low wages and encouraging tight control over inventory." Zukin, supra note i i. By the late i93os, the
large retail chains were able to obtain significant discounts that were not available to their smaller
rivals because of their ability to purchase larger volumes of products from their suppliers. Responding
to evidence of the large chain stores' ability to induce suppliers to grant them discriminatory discounts,
Congress made it illegal for sellers to charge different prices to competing purchasers. The political
climate was summarized by Huey Long when he declared that he "would rather have thieves and
gangsters than chain stores in Louisiana." BECKMAN & NOLES, THE CHAIN STORE PROBLEM 228-9 (938).
70. The courts have taken an inconsistent approach to Robinson-Patman cases involving
suppliers (called "primary line" cases) and those involving buyers (called "secondary line" cases). The
Supreme Court has held that, in order to prevail in a primary line case, competitors of a supplier must
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differential harm competition in an entire resale market. In many cases,
the disadvantaged buyer will suffer a decline in its profit margins, but it
will still remain viable as a competitor in the market. Indeed, in certain
cases, a buyer may not be harmed at all. The relevant price differential
may be so small that the buyer may not be disadvantaged in the
marketplace. Even when a price differential is substantial, a buyer may
be able to obtain the product at the preferred price from another seller.
Nevertheless, the courts would allow such buyers to recover under the
Robinson-Patman Act merely because one of their rivals induced a
supplier to sell to it at a higher price.
The Supreme Court's favor toward plaintiffs in Robinson-Patman
price discrimination cases is at odds with its tilt toward defendants in
Sherman Act refusal-to-deal cases. This dichotomy is illustrated by
considering what would have occurred in Sharp if, instead of terminating
the plaintiff as a distributor, Sharp had simply discriminated in the prices
charged to the plaintiff. In order to prevail under the rule of reason
approach mandated in Sharp, the plaintiff would have had to prove that
competition in the over-all calculator market was harmed as a result of
its termination. Although the terminated dealer was the only competitor
of the favored dealer in Houston and was offering lower prices to
consumers," it would have been difficult for the dealer to demonstrate
that its removal from the intrabrand market for Sharp calculators
substantially harmed competition in the general market for calculators in
the Houston area. The result, however, would have been entirely
different if, instead of terminating the plaintiff, Sharp had simply sold
calculators to the plaintiff's rival at a slightly lower price than that
available to the plaintiff. In such a case, the plaintiff would have
remained an active participant in the Houston market for Sharp
calculators, and consumers would have continued to benefit from its
lower prices. Nevertheless, the plaintiff could have prevailed under the
Robinson-Patman Act without having to prove any injury to
competition, and Sharp would have had no opportunity to defend itself
prove that the supplier injured competition in the primary market by selling products at a price below
its cost. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993).
However, the Court has taken a completely different approach in secondary line cases, holding that
competitive injury can be presumed simply from proof of a substantial price difference among buyers.
See Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 46o U.S. 428 (1983); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334
U.S. 37 (1948). In Morton Salt, the Court concluded that a quantity discount program discriminated
against small purchasers. 334 U.S. at 44. In order to prevail, the plaintiff merely had to prove that it
paid "substantially more for [its] goods than [its] competitors had to pay." Id. at 46-47. Commentators
have criticized the anomaly that gives plaintiffs a greater burden of proof in primary than in secondary
line cases. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Robinson-Patman Act and Competition: Unfinished
Business, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 132 (2000).
71. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 721 ("[the terminated dealer's] retail prices were often below... [the




by demonstrating that the price discrimination had no effect on
competition in the Houston retail market for calculators. 2 Thus, under
the Supreme Court's current approach, an induced refusal to deal that
adversely impacted consumers could go unremedied, while a price
discrimination with no adverse effect at all could be precluded.
C. MONOPSONY PRICING CASES
Monopsony pricing occurs when a single buyer possesses and
exercises sufficient market power to induce one or more suppliers to
reduce their prices below the normal competitive level.73 Antitrust
commentators have concluded that buyers can be liable under the
Sherman Act when they exercise monopsony power.74 There have,
however, been few antitrust cases tried under a monopsony theory. In
the rare cases that have gone to trial, most courts have been unwilling to
hold large buyers liable for aggressively negotiating price reductions,
emphasizing that such reductions benefit consumers and thus are
consistent with antitrust goals.7 As a result of these decisions, antitrust
practitioners and business executives remain uncertain as to whether the
antitrust laws impose any limits on large buyers' ability to negotiate
lower prices from their suppliers.
The economic and legal literature treats monopsony power in a
manner similar to sellers' monopoly power. The Merger Guidelines of
the Department of Justice state, for example, that "the exercise of
market power by buyers.., has adverse effects comparable to those
associated with the exercise of market power by sellers.,6 A reduction in
output by producers is one of the most serious consequences of
monopsony pricing. When a monopsonist reduces the price of a
purchased product below its normal competitive level, the supplier of the
product is likely to reduce the quantity of the product that it makes.
Producers of the relevant product usually are only willing to supply a
lower amount of the product at the price level set by the monopsonist.77
Such conduct hampers economic efficiency, as resources that were used
to produce the product are diverted to other markets where they are
used less effectively.7 Monopsony pricing can also cause a reduction of
72. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
73. Antitrust commentators have defined monopsony power as "the ability of a buyer to reduce
the price of a purchased item.., below the competitive level by restricting its purchases of the item."
Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 14, at 5.
74. See supra note 17 and accompanying text
75. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
76. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, reprinted in
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) para. 13,io4, at 20,571 (1992), available at http://www.ftc.govbc/docs/
horizmer.htm.
77. Dowd, supra note 16, at 1o93.
78. Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 14, at I7.
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output in the resale market. Economists have pointed out that, in order
to lower the price of a purchased product, a monopsonist must restrict
the quantity that it buys.79 "Because the monopsonist buys fewer inputs,
it produces less output in the final product market than would sellers
under competitive conditions." '
The adverse welfare effects of monopsony conduct (i.e., reductions
in output) are not always compensated for by an increase in consumer
welfare. Consumers of the final product made by a monopsonist may not
benefit from a monopsonist's negotiation of lower input prices for itself
because the monopsonist may not pass on the lower prices to its
customers. As two commentators recently pointed out, "[t]he fact that
the monopsonist pays less for supplies in the input market need not mean
that the monopsonist will charge lower prices in the final product market.
Indeed, the opposite is generally the case .... Because monopsonists
typically are also monopolists (in the final product market) lower input
prices do not lead to lower consumer output prices.""'
The exercise of monopsony power also causes a transfer of wealth
from producers to consumers, as "the buyer pays less and the producers,
in return, receive less. ' '"2 Some commentators argue that there is an ideal
balance between "producer surplus" (the difference between the market
price of a product and the cost of producing that product) and "consumer
surplus" (the difference between the market price of a product and the
maximum price consumers are willing to pay for that product). 83 These
commentators define the most efficient competitive equilibrium as "the
point at which consumer and producer surplus is maximized and the
market produces the most efficient output." Monopsonists disturb this
equilibrium when they negotiate prices below the normal competitive
level.5
Despite the adverse economic effects of monopsony pricing, the
courts have been reluctant to preclude such conduct because of its
potential to lower consumer prices. As the Supreme Court stated in State
79. Id. at 9.
8o. Hammer & Sage, supra note 15, at 963.
8i. Id. at 964, 967. Indeed, some commentators have argued that "when the monopsonist has
market power in the output market, the reduced input prices cause higher output prices." Roger D.
Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297,306 (99i).
82. Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 14, at 9. "The essence of a monopsony is the firm's
recognition that.., the firm is able to enhance its profits at the expense of its suppliers." Id. at 6. Some
commentators believe, however, that the economy as a whole is not harmed by the transfer of wealth
from producers to consumers, because "the total level of profits remains unchanged." Id.
83. Dowd, supra note 16, at Io8i nn.19-20.
84. Id. at io8t n.22.




Oil Co. v. Kahn,8 "condemnation of practices resulting in lower prices to
consumers is 'especially costly' because 'cutting prices in order to
increase business is the very essence of competition."'" Concerned about
interfering with aggressive price negotiations, some courts have adopted
a rule of virtual per se legality for monopsony pricing arrangements. In
Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc.," then-Judge Breyer, writing
for the First Circuit, analyzed a payment system implemented by Blue
Shield, a health insurance provider. Blue Shield required doctors to
accept fixed fees for their services that were substantially below the
previous market price. Justice Breyer concluded that, even assuming
Blue Shield exercised significant market power, such conduct "would not
have amounted to a violation of the antitrust laws."'' 9 Breyer emphasized
that "antitrust law rarely stops the buyer of a service from trying to
determine the price or characteristics of the product that will be sold."'
Judge Breyer's decision in Kartell has been influential in several
other cases, where courts have opted to uphold large buyers' negotiation
of lower input prices.9' In Westchester Radiological Associates v. Empire
Blue Cross & Blue Shield," a group of radiologists alleged that an
insurance company had unlawfully used its market power to lower the
prices its subscribers paid for radiology services. The court concluded:
The law does not prevent [a reseller] with market power from
negotiating a good price .... Even if the [reseller] has monopoly
power, an antitrust court will not interfere with a [reseller's]
determination of price .... A legitimate [reseller] is entitled to use its
market power to keep prices down.'
A few courts have concluded, however, that producers can sustain a
Sherman Act claim by demonstrating that a buyer used its market power
to reduce the price of a purchased product below the normal competitive
level. For example, in In Re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation,'4 cattle
86. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
87. Id. at I5 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986)).
88. 749 F.2d 922, 924, 927-29 (ist Cir. 1984).
89. Id. at 924.
9o. Id. at 925.
91. See, for example, United States v. Delta Dental of Rhode Island, 943 F. Supp. 172, 189 (D.R.I.
i986), where the defendants argued for a rule of per se legality, in light of Kartell, for all buyer
behavior short of predation.
92. 7o7 F. Supp. 708 (1989).
93. Id. at 715. Similarly, in Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross, 883 F.2d IIOI (Ist
Cir. 1989), the First Circuit held that a health insurer's negotiation of lower prices from health care
providers does not violate the Sherman Act "unless the prices are 'predatory' or below incremental
cost-even if the insurer is assumed to have monopoly power in the relevant market." Id. at liio-ii.
See also Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 518 F. Supp. 1ioo (D. Conn.
298i) (finding that it was not illegal for Blue Cross insurance plan to set limits on amount it would
reimburse pharmacies for certain prescription drugs).
94. 907 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 199o).
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ranchers alleged that a purchaser of cattle had misused its monopsony
power in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Although the Fifth
Circuit concluded the plaintiffs had insufficient evidence to sustain a
Section 2 claim, it did state the plaintiffs could have prevailed if they
could have proven the purchaser used its market power to reduce "its
purchases of and its prices for fed cattle."'95
It is unclear whether a court will adopt a rule of virtual per se
legality for large buyers' price negotiations, as in the Kartell line of cases,
or whether it will give a plaintiff the opportunity to demonstrate, as in
the Beef Industry case, that a buyer used its market power to reduce its
input prices below the normal competitive level. Until these basic issues
are resolved, buyers and suppliers will remain uncertain of what types of
pricing negotiations are acceptable under the antitrust laws.
Since buyers have recently gained substantial power in so many
United States markets, 6 it is now more important than ever for the
courts to clarify the standards of legality for buyers' competitive conduct.
The next Part sets forth a comprehensive proposal that would clarify the
legality of each of the means by which large buyers exercise their market
power.
III. A PROPOSED MEANS OF ANALYZING BUYERS'
COMPETITIVE CONDUCT
A. ADOPTING A CONTINUUM-BASED APPROACH TO ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
In order to insure a more substantive approach to buyers'
competitive conduct, the courts should discard the formalism of their
outdated "per se" and "rule of reason" categories of antitrust analysis.
Historically, the courts have assumed that they must choose between
those two opposite approaches in Sherman Act cases.97 This Author
argued in several articles written between 1991 and 2001 that the federal
courts should abandon the false distinction between the per se rule and
the rule of reason and recognize that the objective of all Sherman Act
analysis is the same: to determine the substantive economic effect of
defendants' conduct. Instead of relying on either a summary per se or an
extended rule of reason inquiry, the courts should adopt varying degrees
of inquiry, depending upon the type of restraint at issue. Thus Sherman
Act analysis should be regarded, not as being cleft in two by the opposing
per se and rule of reason standards, but as a continuum under which the
courts can utilize many different types of inquiries adapted to the specific
competitive effects of the relevant restraint.9
95. Id. at 515.
96. See supra note I and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 26.
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In 1999, in California Dental Association v. FTC, the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized the proposal of this Author for such a sliding scale
approach to Sherman Act analysis. California Dental involved
advertising restrictions imposed by the California Dental Association.
The restrictions precluded dentists from advertising their prices as "low"
or of similar effect.' The Ninth Circuit had held that the restrictions
should be analyzed under the quick look version of the rule of reason."
The quick look absolves the plaintiff of the need to prove the anti-
competitive effects of a particular restraint, including proof of the
defendant's market power. Under the quick look, the plaintiff need
merely prove that the restraint is of a type that is likely to have anti-
competitive effects.' After such a showing, the burden of proof shifts to
the defendant to demonstrate a pro-competitive justification for the
restraint. The Supreme Court concluded that a quick look analysis was
not appropriate because it was not intuitively obvious that the
advertising restrictions had anti-competitive effects. The Court
recognized, however, that the alternative to the quick look need not
necessarily be a full rule of reason market power analysis."2 The Court
pointed out that "[o]ur categories of analysis of anti-competitive effect
are less fixed than terms like 'per se,' 'quick look,' and 'rule of reason'
tend to make them appear."'I Instead of being divided into discrete
categories, Sherman Act analysis should be viewed as a continuum under
which courts engage in "an enquiry meet for the case."" 4 Citing Philip
Areeda, this Author, and other commentators, the Court stated that, in
Sherman Act cases, "the quality of proof required should vary with the
circumstances.""'' Turning to the advertising restrictions at issue, the
Court held that "a less quick look" was required and remanded "for a
fuller consideration of the issue.' 6
California Dental freed the courts to tailor their analysis to the
particular circumstances of the relevant restraint. The degree of inquiry
appropriate for each restraint will depend upon how confident a judge
can be about its likely competitive effects. This Author anticipated such
99. 526 U.S. 756, 76o-6I n.I (i99).
boo. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 727-28 (9th Cir. i997).
to. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d ioIo, 1020 (ioth Cir. 1998) ("Where a practice has obvious
anti-competitive effects.., there is no need to prove that the defendant possesses market power.").
io2. The Court stated that its rejection of the quick look did not mean a "call for the fullest market
analysis.... [I]t does not follow that every case attacking a "less obviously anticompetitive
restraint.., is a candidate for plenary market examination." Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 779.
io3. Id. at 759.
IO4- Id. at 781.
1o5. Id. at 780 (citing 7 PHILIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 9I I507, at 4o2 (i986); William Kolasky,
Counterpoint: The Department of Justice's "Stepwise" Approach Imposes Too Heavy a Burden on





an approach in a 1991 article in the Southern California Law Review:
The courts should therefore view the per se rule and the rule of reason
not as entirely different approaches to Section i analysis but as related
parts of a continuum. A continuum-based approach would force the
courts to recognize that, although Section i restraints require varying
degrees of inquiry, the objective in each case is identical: to determine
the substantive economic implications of the defendant's conduct.
Under a continuum the courts could classify conduct according to the
clarity of its impact on competition. The clearer the competitive
purpose and effect of the conduct, the closer it would be to the per se
margin of the continuum, where its legality could be determined on its
face; the more ambiguous such purpose and effect, the closer the
conduct would lie to the rule of reason portion of the continuum,
where a complete market analysis would be necessary."
In its recent Polygram decision, the FTC recognized that the
Supreme Court dictated such a continuum-based approach in California
Dental:
[T]he evaluation of horizontal restraints takes place along an analytical
continuum in which a challenged practice is examined in the detail
necessary to understand its competitive effect.... [T]he Court's
opinion [in California Dental] leaves no doubt that it views Section i
analysis as a continuum, rather than a series of distinct boxes (per se,
quick look, full rule of reason).... In the end, the label matters less
than the competitive significance of the restraint, the purpose of which
remains "to form a judgment about the competitive significance of therestraint .."...
Thus, in future cases, the courts should view Sherman Act analysis as
a continuum of progressively more detailed inquiries, framed on one side
by the per se rule's summary approach and on the other by the
traditional rule of reason's detailed market inquiry. Intermediate
approaches, such as the quick look or other approaches not yet named or
defined, would be arrayed between those two extremes.
Such a continuum-based approach is appropriate for the analysis of
buyers' competitive conduct. The three principal means by which large
buyers exercise their market power -oligopsony pricing, induced
discrimination, and monopsony pricing-can be easily classified on the
Sherman Act continuum and analyzed according to their likely
competitive effect. Oligopsony pricing is so clearly anti-competitive that
it can be considered in a summary fashion similar to the traditional per se
approach. This strict approach will deter oligopsonists from fixing input
107. Piraino, Reconciling Approaches, supra note 26, at 710-11.
io8. Polygram, supra note 23, at 22, 25, 49 (citations omitted). A continuum-based approach is also
appropriate for the analysis of competitive conduct under other antitrust statutes. This Author has
argued, for example, that the courts should use a continuum to analyze the legality of mergers in cases
brought under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A New Approach to the




prices and will absolve courts of the need to inquire into the competitive
effects of conduct with no plausible efficiency benefits. The competitive
effects of induced discrimination will depend upon whether a supplier is
acting on its own to enhance the efficiency of its distribution system or
whether it is simply responding to a distributor's desire to avoid
competition with a rival. Cases of induced discrimination should
therefore be placed in the middle of the continuum, where the courts can
inquire into the purpose of the conduct without undertaking an analysis
as complex as the rule of reason. This intermediate approach will protect
suppliers from liability for taking legitimate actions against retailers, but
it will still allow retailers to prevail in cases where they have suffered
unjustified injury. Finally, monopsony pricing is the most ambiguous of
all buyer conduct and thus should be placed at the opposite extreme of
the continuum, where the courts can consider all the relevant economic
circumstances, including a buyer's market power. This detailed approach
will insure that large buyers are not deterred from engaging in aggressive
price negotiations that benefit consumers.
B. OLIGOPSONY PRICING
The anti-competitive effects of oligopsony pricing are the most
obvious of all types of buyer conduct, and the courts can therefore use
the simplest analysis to determine the legality of such behavior. Since the
anti-competitive effects of oligopsony pricing are clear, such conduct can
be classified at the beginning of the Sherman Act continuum and
analyzed in a summary fashion. Buying cartels eliminate all competition
among buyers on input prices. Such cartels harm consumers by
eliminating buyers' incentive to reduce their purchasing costs and pass
them on to consumers. These adverse competitive effects are not justified
by any off-setting efficiency benefits. In order to deter such conduct, the
courts are justified in mitigating plaintiffs' burden of proof and merely
requiring them to demonstrate that a group of buyers agreed to fix the
prices offered to one or more suppliers. Once the plaintiff has met that
burden, the burden of proof should shift to the defendants to
demonstrate that their joint negotiation of purchase prices was carried
out, not by a cartel of independent buyers, but by an integrated
purchasing joint venture formed to reduce purchasing costs. Only in such
a case will the benefit of the buyers' joint price negotiations outweigh
their adverse effect on consumers.
C. INDUCED DISCRIMINATION
Cases of alleged induced discrimination should be classified at the
middle of the Sherman Act continuum and analyzed under an
intermediate approach that is more detailed than the per se rule but less
detailed than the rule of reason. A court's goal in cases of induced
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discrimination should be to determine whether the discrimination was
initiated independently by a supplier or induced by a buyer in order to
disadvantage one of its rivals. Discriminatory actions against retailers are
just as likely to be initiated by suppliers for legitimate reasons as to be
induced by rival retailers for anti-competitive purposes. Thus the courts
should place an intermediate burden on plaintiffs in induced
discrimination cases. In order to prevail, a plaintiff should be required to
prove that a buyer and supplier had a mutual commitment to
discriminate against a rival of the buyer, either by driving the rival from
the market or raising its costs, that the supplier's only reason to effect the
discrimination was to meet the anti-competitive demands of the buyer,
and that the rival was competitively disadvantaged as a result of the
actions of the supplier and the buyer. However, once a plaintiff has met
this burden of proof, it would not have to introduce evidence of the
market power of the supplier or the inducing buyer, nor of any other
conditions affecting the relevant market. This approach will encourage
suppliers to continue to impose and enforce legitimate performance-
based standards on their retailers, but it will also deter suppliers from
conspiring with their large retailers to discriminate against smaller
retailers.
D. DISPENSING WITH PROOF OF MARKET POWER
Under the proposed approach, fact-finders could dispense with a
market power inquiry both in oligopsony pricing and induced
discrimination cases. Market power analysis has been the most complex
of all the factors considered under the traditional rule of reason."
Avoiding a market power analysis will simplify the courts' analysis in
cases of oligopsony pricing and induced discrimination and provide
clearer guidance to large buyers on the permissible limits of such
conduct. There is ample precedent for dispensing with a market power
inquiry into conduct with such obvious anti-competitive effects as
oligopsony pricing and induced discrimination. In NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma,"' the Supreme Court recognized
that "as a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not
justify a naked restriction on price or output .... In such cases, "the rule
of reason can ... be applied in the twinkling of an eye,' .... without proof
to9. See Piraino, Making Sense, supra note 26, at 1763 ("Proof of market power is 'difficult,
complex, expensive and time-consuming,' involving a fact-intensive assessment of the relevant product
and geographic market, each of the parties' shares of those markets, and their competitors' market
shares.") (quoting Philip Areeda, The Changing Contours of the Per Se Rule, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 27, 28
(1985)).
110. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
iti. Id. at io9.
112. Id. at lo9-io n.39.
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of a defendant's market power."3 A similar abbreviated approach is
appropriate in oligopsony pricing and induced discrimination cases.
In its recent decision in Polygram,"4 the FTC concluded that, under
California Dental, a plaintiff "may avoid full rule of reason analysis,
including the pleading and proof of market power, if it demonstrates that
the conduct at issue is inherently suspect owing to its likely tendency to
suppress competition."".5  Polygram and Warner had formed a joint
venture to market an opera recording, and in connection therewith,
agreed not to advertise or discount other opera recordings during a ten-
week period surrounding the initial marketing of the original recording.
The FFC found that the parties' moratorium on advertising or
discounting the other recordings was "inherently suspect" because it
eliminated price competition between the parties. Thus the FTC shifted
the burden to the defendants to prove a legitimate justification for the
moratorium. Since the defendants could not demonstrate such a
justification, the FTC condemned the moratorium without any further
consideration of circumstances such as the defendants' market power."6
Both oligopsony pricing and induced discrimination should qualify
as "inherently suspect" under the FTC's approach in Polygram. Like the
moratorium on advertising and discounting in Polygram, oligopsony
pricing and induced discrimination eliminate competition among direct
competitors. The participants in an oligopsony pricing arrangement
refrain from any competition in bidding on input prices. Once a buyer
has proven that it was competitively disadvantaged as a result of a
discriminatory action induced by one of its competitors, a court should
not have to inquire into the market power of the supplier or the inducing
buyer. When a buyer induces a supplier to cease doing business with a
rival, it completely excludes the rival from competing in the resale
113. Some courts and commentators have concluded, however, that California Dental requires
proof of market power as the first step in rule of reason analysis. See United States v. Visa, 344 F.3d
229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying a three-step rule of reason including: (i) initial proof by the plaintiff
of the defendant's market power; (2) proof by the defendant of the restraint's efficiencies that negate
any adverse competitive effects; and (3) opportunity for the plaintiff to show that the restraint was not
reasonably necessary to achieve alleged efficiency objectives); William Kolasky & Richard Elliott, The
Federal Trade Commission's Three Tenors Decision, ANrrrRuST, Spring 2004, at 50, 54 ("The Supreme
Court's approach in California Dental is consistent with the standard three-step rule of reason
framework the lower courts now use in virtually all rule of reason cases.... Under this standard
framework, the first step is to inquire whether the parties to the alleged restraint have market
power."). These courts and commentators have misinterpreted California Dental. The Court in
California Dental did not conclude that market power analysis is always necessary. Indeed, the Court
reaffirmed its approach in NCAA that challenges to naked restraints on competition need not be
supported by "a detailed market analysis." 526 U.S. at 779. The Court merely stated that fact-finders
cannot avoid a market power approach in all cases: "it does not follow that every case attacking a less
obviously anti-competitive restraint.., is a candidate for plenary market examination." Id.
114- See supra note 23.
115. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
iI6. Id. at 48-49.
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market for the relevant product. If a buyer induces a supplier to
discriminate in price, it raises the rival's costs and makes it a less effective
competitor in the relevant market. As in Polygram, a plaintiff who
proves that a buyer has engaged in such inherently suspect conduct
should not have to prove the conspiring parties' market power.
E. MONOPSONY PRICING
Unlike oligopsony pricing and induced discrimination, monopsony
pricing does not have an obvious anti-competitive effect. Monopsony
pricing, in fact, often results in lower prices for consumers. Thus, there is
no reason for the courts to dispense with a market power analysis in
monopsony pricing cases. Indeed, the courts should place the highest
burden of proof on plaintiffs in such cases. Before sanctioning large
buyers for engaging in aggressive price negotiations, the courts must be
absolutely certain that competition in the relevant market has been
harmed."7 A plaintiff in a monopsony pricing case should be required to
prove that a buyer has enough market power to reduce the price of a
purchased item below its normal competitive level and that the buyer
exercised that power to effect such a price reduction. In addition, the
plaintiff should have to demonstrate that the price reduction has the
potential to harm competition in the market for the relevant product.
The plaintiff's proof of competitive harm, however, need not be as
complicated as under the traditional rule of reason. Plaintiffs would not,
for example, be required to prove economic factors, such as observable
reductions in output, that are usually impossible to verify. A court should
be able to infer the requisite competitive harm when a monopsonist
forces a supplier to reduce its prices substantially below the normal
competitive level and the supplier cannot find an alternative buyer at
market prices for an extended period of time. Such an approach ensures
that large buyers will not be deterred from negotiating lower prices, but
it still protects suppliers from monopsony buyers that misuse their
market power.
F. ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
The new continuum-based approach to buyer conduct encourages
behavior beneficial to consumers and deters conduct that harms
consumers. The approach requires the least inquiry by fact-finders, and
makes it easiest for plaintiffs to prevail, in cases of oligopsony pricing,
which are most likely to limit competition among buyers and to raise
prices. The approach imposes an intermediate burden on plaintiffs and
on fact-finders in cases of induced discrimination, which are equally
117. Some commentators have asserted that "a powerful argument can be made that the per se
rule should never apply" to buyers' negotiation of purchase prices, because such conduct usually does
not harm competition. Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 14, at 45.
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likely to benefit as to harm consumers. Finally, the approach makes it
most difficult for plaintiffs to prevail when buyers engage in monopsony
pricing, which, of all the types of buyer conduct, is most likely to benefit
consumers.
The following graph demonstrates the effect which the new
approach is likely to have on the conduct of large buyers. The continuum
of buyer conduct is arrayed on the X axis, ranging from the least to the
most desirable, while the Y axis represents the degree of inquiry required
by a fact-finder and the corresponding burden of proof placed on a
plaintiff. The sloping line describes the deterrent effect of the proposed
approach on the three main types of buyer conduct. The deterrent effect
is highest for oligopsony pricing, intermediate for induced discrimination,
and lowest for monopsony pricing.
Degree of Inquiry
(Burden on Deterrent effect
Plaintiff)
Oligopsony Pricing Induced Discrimination Monopsony Pricing
IV. APPLYING THE NEW APPROACH TO OLIGOPSONY PRICING
A. NAKED FIXING OF INPUT PRICES
Oligopsony pricing occurs when several buyers join forces to
negotiate a standard price from one or more of their suppliers. The
federal courts have used both a per se and rule of reason approach to
oligopsony pricing, and they have confused business executives and
antitrust practitioners by failing to explain the dividing line between
those two approaches."' Under the proposed approach, the legality of
oligopsony pricing will be clear. Since the anti-competitive effects of
oligopsony pricing are obvious, the courts should place such conduct at
the abbreviated inquiry extreme of the continuum. In order to prevail in
a Sherman Act case, plaintiffs should merely have to prove that a group
ii8. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
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of independent buyers agreed to offer the same prices to one or more
suppliers for identical products."9
Naked agreements among competing sellers to fix the prices of their
products have been considered per se illegal since the earliest days of the
Sherman Act.2 Courts and commentators refer to such price-fixing
arrangements as "cartels ....' Although the federal courts have taken a
less aggressive approach in many antitrust areas during the last three
decades, they never have wavered in their condemnation of price-fixing
among competitors. In 2004, Justice Scalia (rarely an advocate of
aggressive antitrust enforcement) described cartels as "the supreme evil
of antitrust,' .... while the Ninth Circuit concluded that "[n]o antitrust
violation is more abominated than the agreement to fix prices.' 23 Cartels
are so restrictive of competition, and so completely lack any redeeming
efficiency justification, that they have been considered appropriate for
criminal prosecution.2 4 Since the anti-competitive effects of cartel
119. In order to meet the statutory requirements of Section I of the Sherman Act for a
"conspiracy ... in restraint of trade" (15 U.S.C. § I (2ooo)), a plaintiff must prove that a group of
buyers entered into an agreement among themselves to offer identical purchase prices to their
suppliers. The agreement can be express or implied from circumstances. Just as in cases involving
oligopoly sellers, the courts can infer an agreement among oligopsony buyers from parallel pricing
accompanied by certain "plus factors," such as price signaling or other communications. For a
discussion of how such plus factors are analyzed in oligopoly cases, see Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.,
Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 30-40 (2004). In In re
Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 907 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. i99o), the Fifth Circuit held that there was
insufficient evidence of a conspiracy among meat packers to offer identical low prices to cattle
ranchers. More recent cases involving the inference of oligopsony pricing from plus factors include
Pease v. Jasper Wyman & Sons, 845 A.2d 552 (Me. 2003) (denying defendants' summary judgment
motion on conspiracy issue based on buyers' communications regarding input prices), and DeLoach v.
Phillip Morris Cos., Inc., No. o-CV-I235, 2001 WL 1301221, at *I (W.D.N.C. July 24, 2001) (rejecting
defendants' motion to dismiss on ground that buyers met before tobacco auctions to exchange price
information).
120. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 293 (6th Cir. 1898) (refusing to
consider possible justifications for horizontal price-fixing).
121. See Dianne P. Wood, The Incredible Shrinking Per Se Rule: Is an End in Sight?, Presentation
Before the Antitrust Section of the A.B.A., at 3 (Apr. 1, 2004) (on file with the Author) ("The area in
which the per se rule continues to be invoked most often, and continues to have real bite, is that of the
hard-core cartel. By the term 'hard-core cartel,' antitrust lawyers normally mean an agreement
between horizontal competitors... to fix prices or to engage in equivalent behaviors.").
122. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
123. Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc., 369 F.3 d 11o8, II 16 (9th Cir. 2004).
124. See Wood, supra note 121, at 4 ("Hard-core cartels are so obviously anti-competitive, and so
plainly forbidden by the Sherman Act, that the Department of Justice often chooses to pursue them
under the criminal aspect of the antitrust laws."). Some commentators, however, have argued that
little economic benefit has resulted from the courts' harsh approach to price-fixing cartels. See, e.g.,
Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing
the Evidence, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 2003, at 3, 14-15 (referring to studies showing that
prosecution of various cartels had no effect on consumer prices). But see Jonathon B. Baker, The Case
for Antitrust Enforcement, J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 2003, at 27, 28-30 (explaining over-charging
resulting from price-fixing cartels).
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arrangements are clear, the courts have not been willing to consider any
pro-competitive justifications offered by sellers engaged in price-fixing.'
The adverse competitive effects of price-fixing conspiracies among
buyers are no less obvious. The only effects of such conspiracies are to
prevent competition among buyers on input prices. The prices of raw
materials and finished goods purchased for resale are an important
component of buyers' overall costs. Consumers benefit when buyers seek
their own innovative ways of limiting such costs and pass on the cost
savings to their customers. Input prices are likely to reach their lowest
levels when buyers are competing aggressively against each other to
obtain the best possible terms from their suppliers. When buyers
abandon such competition and offer identical prices to their suppliers,
they lose all incentive to obtain a cost advantage over each other.
Furthermore, such buyers are more likely to cooperate to retain the
benefits of any cost savings for themselves. Once a group of buyers has
successfully conspired to reduce their collective input prices, they will be
more inclined to conspire with each other to keep their resale prices
high.26 Indeed, economic studies indicate that buyers engaged in
monopsony or oligopsony pricing are less likely than other buyers to pass
on the benefit of lower input prices to consumers.
27
Since the anti-competitive effects of oligopsony pricing are clear,
there is no reason for the courts to consider market conditions before
finding such arrangements illegal. Some courts have recognized that
oligopsony pricing should be illegal regardless of the aggregate market
power of the buyers participating in such an arrangement. In Law v.
NCAA,'28 the court struck down an NCAA rule limiting the salaries that
its member colleges could pay to certain coaches. The court emphasized
that this rule "specifically prohibits the free operation of a market
responsive to demand and is thus inconsistent with the Sherman Act's
mandates.. . .. 2' Therefore it was "not necessary for the court to
undertake an extensive market analysis to determine that the rule had an
anticompetitive effect on the market for coaching services.' 3 In agreeing
to pay an identical salary to certain types of coaches, the members of the
NCAA were acting as members of a cartel to fix the price of common
services. Any similar agreements among competing buyers are no less
inimical to the operation of a free market and should be treated no less
harshly, regardless of the market power of the participating buyers.'3'
125. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
126. See Baker, supra note 124, at 30.
127. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
128. 902 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Kan. 1995), affd, 134 F.3d lOiO (loth Cir. 1998).
129. Id. at 1405.
130. Id.
131. But see In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 9o7 F.2d 510, 96 (5th Cir. 199o) (stating that alleged
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Some commentators have questioned whether it is appropriate to
hold naked agreements illegal when the parties lack the market power
necessary to limit competition in the relevant market.'32 However, there
are several reasons to condemn such arrangements summarily. First,
defining markets is a complicated process, and it makes little sense to
waste judicial resources in such an analysis when the challenged conduct
has no legitimate efficiency objective. As Professor Areeda has asserted,
"[t]he defendants have little moral standing to demand proof of power or
effect when the most they can say for themselves is that they tried to
harm the public but were mistaken in their ability to do so.
'I33
Furthermore, the antitrust laws will have less deterrent effect if
defendants believe there is any possibility that they can sustain naked
restrictions of competition. A clear rule prohibiting such conduct stops
undesirable behavior at its inception and prevents it from ripening into a
full-blown competitive threat.' "
B. DISTINGUISHING CARTELS FROM LEGITIMATE PURCHASING
JOINT VENTURES
Once a plaintiff meets its initial burden of proving that buyers have
agreed to negotiate common purchase prices, the burden should shift to
the buyers to demonstrate that such negotiations were conducted, not by
a cartel of independent buyers, but by a single integrated purchasing
joint venture formed by the buyers in order to reduce their purchasing
costs. Naked agreements by independent buyers to negotiate common
purchase prices should be illegal on their face because they eliminate
competition without any off-setting efficiency benefit. An opposite
approach, however, is appropriate when buyers negotiate input prices in
connection with a legitimate purchasing joint venture. Buyers who have
formed such a joint venture should be permitted to negotiate common
input prices because such negotiations are necessary to achieve the
legitimate objectives of the venture."'
conspiracy among two buyers of cattle was "economically unfeasible" because market included other
buyers that could pay higher prices for cattle and divert cattle from the supposed conspirators).
132. See, e.g., Thomas S. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal
Agreements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 6I
ANTITRUST L.J. 579, 602-03 (993) (stating that the marketplace will discipline firms that attempt to
restrain trade if they lack substantial market power); M. Laurence Popofsky & David B. Goodwin,
The "Hard-Boiled" Rule of Reason Revisited, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 203 (1987) (indicating that two
firms that agree to a horizontal restraint are unlikely to injure competition if they lack market power).
133. 7 PHILIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1 1510, at 411 (1986).
134. Jonathon Baker has described how clear antitrust rules can deter anti-competitive conduct by
business executives: "Many managers may never personally be involved in an antitrust case, but they
hear about others who are, and they learn about the rules through guidance provided by their firm's
antitrust counsel. Threat of antitrust enforcement may deter anti-competitive actions in all markets,
not just those where antitrust prosecutions occur." Baker, supra note 124, at 4o.
135. Many commentators have argued that the antitrust laws should not interfere with buyers'
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The distinction between cartels and joint ventures is critical. In a
cartel, competitors enter into a naked agreement to fix prices without
integrating their operations in any manner.' 36 The members of a cartel do
not participate in any productive combination of their individual
capacities; their cooperation is limited to an agreement on some
minimum level of price coordination and enforcement.'37 No economic
benefit is possible in the absence of any integration of resources among
the members of a cartel.' By contrast, a joint venture has the ability to
generate economic efficiencies. In a joint venture, the parties combine
business functions or other resources that they previously held
separately. By integrating their purchasing operations, competing buyers
can eliminate redundant costs and achieve economies of scale.'39 Thus, a
group of buyers accused of oligopsony pricing should have the
opportunity to prove that their joint negotiation of common purchase
prices was undertaken in connection with "a bona fide integration of
productive assets and is not simply a sham to hide naked price fixing or
market allocation.' 40
joint purchasing activities. See, e.g., Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 14, at 23 ("fAjntitrust rules
should be designed to avoid interfering with most joint purchasing activities."); Michael K. Lindsey,
Joint Purchasing Arrangements, 6I ANTrrRUST L.J. 401, 402 (1993) (suggesting that competitors that
agree to jointly purchase resale inventory can buy at lower prices and increase efficiency).
136. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have adopted Antitrust Guidelines
for Collaborations Among Competitors, which states that "[tihe mere coordination of decisions on
price, output, customers, territories and the like" does not constitute sufficient integration to qualify
for joint venture treatment. Reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) para. 13,461, at 20,855 (992),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/Os/2ooo/o4/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
137. Indeed, the courts often use such coordination and enforcement to infer the existence of a per
se illegal price fixing conspiracy. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968) (inferring a
price-fixing conspiracy when a newspaper hired outside agents to enforce maximum resale prices),
overruled by State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); see also United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
U.S. 29, 45 (196o) (inferring an illegal conspiracy from wholesalers' policing and enforcement of
suggested resale prices).
138. See Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the
Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRusT L.J. 337, 376 (2000) ("Economic integration.., is vital to productive
efficiency.").
139. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 136, at 20,858 ("Purchasing collaborations... may enable
participants to centralize ordering, to combine warehousing or distribution functions more efficiently,
or to achieve other efficiencies."); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High
Technology Competition, 44 Win. & MARY L. REV. 65, 142-43 (2002) [hereinafter Piraino, Proposed
Approach to High Technology] ("Purchasing collaborations allow competitors to centralize ordering,
combine warehousing or distribution functions, and pool their bargaining power to reduce suppliers'
prices."); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaborations Among
Competitors, 86 IowA L. REv. 1137, 1172-73 (2001) (describing joint venture efficiencies); Thomas A.
Piraino, Jr., Reconciling Competition and Cooperation: A New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 871, 883-90 (1994) [hereinafter Piraino, Reconciling Competition and
Cooperation] (same); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule of Reason or Merger Analysis: A
New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 MINN. L. REV. I, 8-Io (1991) [hereinafter Piraino,
Beyond Per Se] (same).
140. Kolasky & Elliott, supra note 113, at 51.
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Purchasing joint ventures among competing buyers usually have a
net beneficial effect on competition. Such ventures provide competitive
efficiencies that the parties could not have achieved on their own. The
benefits of the venture exceed those that would have resulted from a
mere pooling of the parties' bargaining power. Indeed, the Supreme
Court opted for a rule of reason rather than a per se approach in
Northwest Wholesale because the parties had combined their purchasing
functions in a joint venture that had the capability of enhancing their
efficiency. 4' At the same time, purchasing joint ventures have a minimal
anti-competitive effect because they operate at the upstream level of the
production process. As long as they are confined to the purchasing level,
such joint ventures cannot affect their partners' decisions on output or on
pricing." Since the beneficial competitive effects of purchasing joint
ventures almost always outweigh their adverse effects, courts should
uphold purchasing joint ventures on their face.'43
This Author has argued that, if a joint venture is legal, the courts
should also permit the parties to the venture to enter into any
agreements among themselves that are required to carry out the
legitimate objectives of the venture.'" This approach, which has been
referred to as the "ancillary restraints doctrine,"'"5 was first established in
the 1898 case, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 4 6 In that case,
141. 472 U.S. 284, 295 (1985).
142. Certain commentators have argued that joint purchasing arrangements should be treated
even more leniently than joint ventures among sellers. See Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 14, at 4
("[T]he antitrust treatment of joint buyer activity should not be symmetric to the treatment of joint
seller activity."). This Author has asserted that most purchasing joint ventures should be upheld,
because they usually have a net beneficial competitive effect. See Piraino, Beyond Per Se, supra note
139, at 40 ("As upstream joint ventures, buying groups usually do not have significant anti-competitive
effects."); Piraino, Reconciling Competition and Cooperation, supra note 139, at 922 ("Purchasing
cooperatives.., are not likely to increase the price or limit the availability of consumer end
products."); Piraino, A Proposed Approach to High Technology, supra note 139, at 142 ("[H]igh
technology purchasing joint ventures generate substantial efficiencies and have few, if any, adverse
effects.").
143. The courts should, however, review the conduct of purchasing joint ventures to confirm that
they have not taken steps to unreasonably limit competition. If, for example, a purchasing joint
venture includes most of the buyers in the relevant market, it could use its market power to engage in
illegal monopsony pricing. Such conduct should be analyzed under the approach described in Part VI
of this Article. The partners to a purchasing joint venture may also extend their cooperation beyond
the legitimate scope of the venture. Buyers engaged in a purchasing joint venture should not be
allowed to exchange information on production or pricing plans. It is not necessary for the parties to
have access to such information in order to operate a purchasing joint venture. A court could
reasonably infer that the only purpose of such information exchanges was to facilitate coordination of
output or pricing among the joint venture partners.
144. See Piraino, Beyond Per Se, supra note 139, at 56 ("Any related competitive restrictions that
are necessary for the legitimate purposes of a joint venture should be per se legal.").
145. See Piraino, Proposed Approach to High Technology, supra note 139, at 139 (describing
ancillary restraints doctrine).
146. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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Judge (later President and Chief Justice) William Howard Taft
distinguished between "naked" restraints, which should be illegal on
their face because they are unrelated to any efficiency-enhancing
integration, and "ancillary" restraints, which are permissible because
they are necessary to promote the legitimate objectives of a cooperative
arrangement.'47 For nearly eighty years, the federal courts neglected
Judge Taft's approach. In the last twenty-five years, however, the
ancillary restraints doctrine has re-emerged in the lower federal courts,
as they have begun to adopt a more sophisticated approach to antitrust
analysis. In several cases, the federal circuit courts have separately
examined competitive restraints among joint venture partners to
determine whether they were necessary to promote a venture's
legitimate objectives.' Most recently, in Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit, citing this Author, applied an ancillary restraints
analysis to a price-fixing agreement implemented by the parties to a
marketing joint venture for the Shell and Texaco brands of gasoline.'49
The Ninth Circuit stated that "the issue with respect to legitimate joint
ventures is whether the price fixing is 'naked' (in which case the restraint
is illegal) or 'ancillary' (in which case it is not).'.5 It concluded that the
legality of the price-fixing arrangement at issue should depend upon
"whether the specific restraint is sufficiently important to attaining the
lawful objectives of the joint venture ...
147. Id. at 282-83.
148- See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 964 (1oth Cir. 1994) (denial of
membership in credit card system); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,
210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noncompetition agreement among agents of van lines); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest
City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (noncompetition agreement among retailers).
In 1979, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System ("BMI"), 44I U.S. I (1979),
the Supreme Court implicitly adopted an ancillary restraints approach to a price-fixing agreement
among a group of competitors involved in a marketing joint venture. Approximately twenty thousand
musical composers had formed an association to sell their copyrighted compositions through a blanket
license that set a common licensing fee for the use of the members' compositions. Id. at 5. Although
the Court conceded that the license constituted price fixing "in the literal sense," id. at 9, it
nevertheless adopted a rule of reason approach to consider the efficiencies of the arrangement,
including the fact that the license permitted composers to offer a unique product that otherwise would
have been unavailable to consumers. Id. at 23.
The FTC also adopted an ancillary restraints approach in its recent decision in Polygram, where
two recording companies had formed a joint venture to market recordings of a particular concert.
When they formed the joint venture, the parties agreed not to compete with each other in marketing
recordings of earlier concerts. The FIC held that the restrictions on the marketing of the prior
recordings "cannot be considered 'ancillary' to the present joint venture, as a matter of law, because
they are not related to the efficiencies the joint venture was created to produce." Polygram, supra note
23, at 48.
149. 369 F.3d i io8 (9th Cir. 2004).
15o. Id. at i18.
151. Id. at 1121 n.14 ("'If a joint venture itself is procompetitive, the courts should uphold any
restrictions on competition necessary to achieve its legitimate purposes ....') (quoting Piraino,
Collaborations Among Competitors, supra note 12, at 1188-89). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
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The submission by buyers of uniform bids for purchased products
should be deemed permissible as a restraint ancillary to a purchasing
joint venture. In most cases, it will be necessary for a purchasing joint
venture to submit a single bid on behalf of all its members in order to
achieve its legitimate purpose. Most purchasing joint ventures are
formed by buyers in order to reduce their purchasing costs. Since
purchasing joint ventures themselves have a net beneficial effect, they
should be permitted to take the steps necessary to meet their legitimate
objectives. The partners to a purchasing joint venture cannot integrate
their purchasing operations and reduce costs without allowing the joint
venture to negotiate purchase prices on behalf of its partners. The
submission of joint bids is a natural consequence of the integration of
purchasing functions in a joint venture. Indeed, after they have combined
their purchasing functions in a joint venture, the partners should have no
choice other than to submit joint bids to their suppliers.
C. OLIGOPSONY PRICING EXAMPLES
Two recent cases involving oligopsony pricing for employees'
services illustrate the advantages of the proposed approach. Maurice
Clarett, a running back at Ohio State University who had finished his
sophomore year, sued the NFL in 2004, alleging that its rule prohibiting
younger college players from entering the NFL draft was illegal under
the Sherman Act.' Mr. Clarett alleged that because of "the NFL's
unique position in the professional football market," the concerted
action of the NFL teams in implementing the eligibility rule deprived
him of the opportunity to pursue, "at least for the time being," a career
in professional football.'53 In 2002, in Jung v. Association of Medical
Colleges,'54 plaintiffs representing medical residents filed a Sherman Act
class action suit against all the non-governmental teaching hospitals in
the United States.'5 The suit claims that the hospitals violated the
Sherman Act by implementing a "matching program" that assigns new
residents to particular hospitals. Under the program, medical students
and hospitals rank each other in order of preference, a computer
generates a match, and the hospitals require students to accept
employment with the "matched" hospital. According to the Complaint in
Jung, this practice avoids a bidding war among hospitals for new
defendants' price-fixing arrangement should be deemed per se illegal, because "[t]he
defendants.., failed to offer any explanation of how their unified pricing of the distinct Shell and
Texaco brands of gasoline served to further the ventures' legitimate efforts to produce better products
or capitalize on efficiencies." Id. at i 122.
152. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3 d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
153. Id. at 141.
154. Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls. (D.D.C. 2002) (No. o2CVoo873).
155. See Tanya Ott, Residents Overworked/Underpaid, supra note i.
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physicians' services, keeping their salaries artificially low. ' 6 While the
case was later dismissed because of Congress's passage of a rider
specifically stating that the defendants' conduct did not violate antitrust
laws, the facts remain illustrative of a typical oligopsony case.'57
The conduct of the NFL and of the hospitals in these two cases could
be analyzed easily under the proposed approach. The NFL and the
hospitals allegedly reduced their employees' potential earnings by
limiting their negotiations to a single entity. (one NFL team or one
hospital). By collaborating to impose uniform conditions of employment
on their prospective employees, both the NFL teams and the teaching
hospitals engaged in a form of oligopsony pricing. Under the proposed
approach, the legality of the employment restrictions imposed by the
NFL teams and by the teaching hospitals would depend upon one factor:
whether they constituted a naked cartel to fix prices or a restraint
ancillary to a legitimate joint venture.
The NFL's restriction on admitting younger players should be
upheld as a legitimate ancillary restraint. Although Maurice Clarett
should be able to meet his initial burden of proving that the NFL teams
engaged in oligopsony pricing, the NFL should be able to rebut Mr.
Clarett's case by proving that such pricing was ancillary to the efficiency
objectives of a joint venture. The NFL itself is a legitimate joint venture
because its member teams have integrated their operations in a manner
necessary to produce the NFL brand of football and market it to the
public. 5 The NFL has established certain ancillary restraints that
regulate competition among its teams, such as schedules, player
eligibility, and the manner in which games should be played. Although
those restrictions limit competition among team members, they should
be permissible because they are necessary for the effective operation of
the league. Indeed, the NFL could not operate at all without reasonable
rules defining players who are of the age and experience level necessary
to compete in the league. The rule challenged by Maurice Clarett
constitutes a reasonable attempt by the NFL to define those who have
the requisite maturity to be NFL players. Thus, a court should uphold the
rule under the proposed approach. 9
156. See Complaint, Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Coils. (D.D.C. 2002) (No. 02CVoo873).
157. See National Resident Matching Program, National Resident Matching Program Hails
Judicial Opinion Protecting Graduate Medical Education, Aug. 13, 2004 at http://www. savethematch.
org/files/tbl sioNews/FileUpload 4 4 /Iooi4/Jung% 2oDismissal.pdf.
158. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports, 79
B.U. L. REV. 889,923 (1999).
159. The Second Circuit, however, never had to engage in an ancillary restraints analysis in the
Clarett case. The court concluded that, because the NFL's eligibility rule was dealt with in the
collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and the players' union, the rule was exempt from
antitrust scrutiny under the non-statutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws. See Clarett v. NFL,
369 F.3d 124, 138-41 (2d Cir. 2004).
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In Jung, the plaintiffs should be able to prove that the teaching
hospitals agreed to impose uniform employment conditions on their
prospective residents through the matching program. Thus, the legality
of the program would depend upon whether the hospitals could prove at
trial that they had combined their resources in a legitimate purchasing
joint venture. It should be relatively easy for a court to resolve that issue.
If the hospitals had not integrated their operations in any manner, they
could not generate any efficiencies beneficial to consumers. In such a
case, the hospitals would simply have agreed to coordinate their
independent offers to resident physicians in a way that eliminates any
possibility of competitive bidding. The hospitals' arrangement would
constitute nothing more than a naked cartel designed to fix the price of
physicians' salaries. Such a cartel not only harms residents by reducing
their potential earnings, it also provides a vehicle for the hospitals to
conspire to retain any cost savings from residents' salaries for
themselves, rather than passing them on to patients. Under the proposed
approach, a court would preclude the arrangement without any further
consideration.
V. APPLYING THE NEW APPROACH TO INDUCED DISCRIMINATION
A. DISTINGUISHING BUYER-INDUCED FROM INDEPENDENT
SUPPLIER CONDUCT
The federal courts have found it difficult to decide when to preclude
or permit suppliers' discriminatory treatment of rival buyers. Courts have
consistently held that it should be per se illegal for several resellers to
induce a supplier not to deal with another buyer at all or only to do
business with it on discriminatory terms. However, in cases such as
Sharp, when only one buyer induces such conduct, the courts have
concluded that the rule of reason should apply. ' There is no economic
basis for the courts' distinction between single and multiple inducement
cases.
The proposed approach eliminates this artificial distinction in favor
of a substantive economic analysis of all induced discrimination cases.
The relevant economic distinction is not between single and multiple
inducements but between conduct induced by one or more resellers and
that undertaken independently by suppliers. Resellers have only an anti-
competitive purpose for inducing a supplier to discriminate against a
rival. By contrast, suppliers almost always have a legitimate pro-
competitive reason for independent actions that adversely affect their
resellers. Thus suppliers' independent actions to discipline resellers
16o. See supra text accompanying notes 54-63.
I6I. See supra Part II.B.
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should be permitted on their face. On the other hand, discriminatory
actions induced by competing resellers should be precluded whenever
the targeted reseller is competitively disadvantaged.
When a supplier acts independently to terminate a reseller or
selectively increase its prices, a fact-finder can be confident that the
supplier is acting to enhance the efficiency of its distribution system. A
supplier is interested in preserving as much competition as possible in the
resale of its products and will only want to eliminate or disadvantage a
dealer that is not effectively promoting its products. A natural system of
checks and balances insures the beneficial impact of discriminatory
actions independently effected by suppliers. A manufacturer can be
relied upon to pursue its own self-interest in minimizing the adverse
competitive effect of actions that affect its distributors. As one
commentator has explained, a "supplier has no interest in destroying
competition among its own distributors or dealers, which would injure
itself as well as the smaller dealers and customers. '' 6 ' A manufacturer
would not proceed with a termination whose only effect was to reduce
competition in the resale of its products and increase retail prices. When
a manufacturer independently decides to terminate a distributor, and
thus to reduce competition in the resale of its products, it can safely be
assumed that it expects, in return, some offsetting benefit to consumers
in the form of increased services. Termination of a non-performing
distributor may be a means for a manufacturer to signal the remaining
distributors of the importance of performing more effectively. By the
same token, a manufacturer may introduce differential pricing to
encourage its dealers to enhance their performance. For example, an
automobile manufacturer might give price concessions to large dealers
that meet certain quotas for selling automobiles. Smaller dealers that are
less successful in promoting automobiles will have to pay a higher price.
Such a "manufacturer has facilitated competition by providing an
incentive to dealers to become more aggressive in promoting the seller's
brand."' 63
The competitive effects of discriminatory treatment, however, are
completely different when they are induced by a rival of the
disadvantaged reseller. Such conduct has nothing to do with promoting
the supplier's efficiency in the resale of its products. Unlike a supplier, a
reseller is not motivated to enhance competition in the resale of the
manufacturer's product, but is usually driven by a desire to restrict
competition in order to protect its profit margins. One commentator has
explained the obvious motive for one reseller to induce a supplier to
162. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Robinson-Patman Act and Competition: Unfinished Business, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 137 (2000).
163. Id. at 127.
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terminate a rival: "It is axiomatic that firms prefer to have fewer rather
than more rivals... ."'6 Buyers may also attempt to disadvantage a rival
by inducing a supplier to sell to it at a discriminatory price. It is precisely
such conduct that caused Congress to prohibit price discrimination in the
Robinson-Patman Act. As one of the principal drafters of the Act
explained, "[t]he bill is based entirely upon the fact that large buyers, by
the coercive use of their buying power, extract from the seller
differentials greater than the cost differences between the two buyers
warrant."' 65 The Robinson-Patman Act, in fact, includes a specific
provision that makes buyers liable for inducing discriminatory prices. 66
The adverse competitive effect of induced discrimination stems from
the ability of a reseller to use its bargaining power to force a supplier to
take an action against another reseller that is contrary to the supplier's
independent interests.' 6' A distributor rarely possesses enough market
power to convince its supplier to take a discriminatory action against
another distributor when the supplier would have preferred the status,68
quo. However, there are cases in which a supplier, faced with an
ultimatum from a dealer, may choose to proceed with a discriminatory
action it otherwise would have foregone. Preferring to keep both dealers,
the supplier nevertheless may conclude that "terminating the plaintiff
hurts... less (considering sales lost, transaction costs in finding and
perhaps training a replacement, and any spillover effects upon his
relations with other dealers) than losing the complainer's patronage."'
69
This may be particularly true when the complaining distributor purchases
a significantly larger volume of products from the supplier than the
disadvantaged distributor.
Thus fact-finders can assume that discriminatory actions that
originate with one or more competing resellers have no purpose other
than to suppress competition. No conceivable efficiency-enhancing
164. Kenneth L. Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section i of the Sherman Act, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. I, 14 (2oo2).
165. Statement of H.B. Teegarden, Counsel for the United States Wholesale Grocers Ass'n,
Hearings on H.R. 4995, H.R. 5062, and H.R. 8442, Before the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 74th
Cong., at 217 (1933).
I66. Section 2(f) of the Act makes it unlawful for a buyer "knowingly to induce or receive" a
discriminatory price prohibited by the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (2000).
167. This Author has argued that actions by a defendant contrary to its legitimate independent
interests can form the basis for an inference that the defendant was acting for an anti-competitive
purpose. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under the Sherman Act,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 845-48 (2000) (arguing for such an approach in Section 2 monopolization
cases); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 9, 33-36 (2004) (arguing for such an approach in Section I price-fixing cases).
i68. In Sharp, the Supreme Court recognized that "[r]etail market power is rare, because of the
usual presence of interbrand competition and other dealers ..." Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727 n.2 (1988) (citation omitted).
169. 7 PHILIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW $I 1457a-1457b, at 166-67 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
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objective exists for such conduct. If the action were necessary to insure
more effective distribution of a supplier's products, the supplier would
have taken the action on its own. The only purpose of induced
discrimination is to exclude the disadvantaged reseller from the market
entirely or to make it more difficult for the disadvantaged reseller to
compete with the firm inducing the supplier's action. The inducing buyer
obtains no efficiency gains or other benefits from its actions, other than
the elimination of competition at the resale level. In fact, a buyer's
inducement of discriminatory treatment may reduce its efficiency, for
such demands waste valuable negotiating leverage that the buyer
otherwise could have used to achieve concessions from a supplier on
price, delivery, or quality.
B. A NEW APPROACH TO INDUCED DISCRIMINATION
In Sharp, the Supreme Court assumed that there were no
alternatives for analyzing induced terminations, other than the per se
rule or the rule of reason. The Court chose the rule of reason for single
inducement cases while acknowledging the continued viability of its
earlier precedent applying the per se rule to multiple inducement cases. 70
Fortunately, the Court's later decision in California Dental freed fact-
finders from the need to choose between the extremes of a summary per
se and an extended rule of reason inquiry. 7' Under California Dental, the
courts can now use a variety of approaches between those two extremes
that are tailored to the specific competitive circumstances of the conduct
at issue.
All cases involving alleged induced discrimination, regardless of the
number of firms on the inducing level, should be analyzed, not under the
per se rule or the rule of reason, but under an intermediate approach that
requires the plaintiff to prove the purpose of the conduct but absolves it
of the burden of proving market power. By applying the same
intermediate analysis in all cases of induced discrimination, the approach
insures that, regardless of the number of buyers on the inducing level,
courts' decisions will be guided by the substantive competitive effect of
the conduct at issue. First, to meet the statutory requirements of Section
I of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff should have to prove the existence of
a conspiracy between the supplier and inducing buyer to discriminate
against the plaintiff. Secondly, the plaintiff should have to prove that a
reseller's pressure on a supplier caused the supplier to take the
discriminatory action. Finally, the plaintiff should have to demonstrate
that it was competitively disadvantaged as a result of the supplier's
action. However, once the plaintiff proved a conspiracy, causation and
170. 485 U.S. at 734.
171. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (I999).
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competitive harm, it should not have to introduce any evidence of the
market power of the supplier or inducing reseller, nor of any other
conditions affecting the relevant market.
Dispensing with a market power inquiry is justified because
conspiracies between a buyer and supplier to disadvantage a competitor
of the buyer constitute a naked restriction of output. The restriction on
output is obvious when a supplier agrees to cease doing business with the
buyer's competitor. The competitor will be excluded from the market
entirely if it has no reasonable alternative source of supply for the
relevant product. The restriction on output is no less severe when a
buyer and supplier conspire to insure that the buyer's competitor pays a
higher price for the relevant product. Andrew Gavil has pointed out that
such agreements "place an equally efficient rival at a significant, but
unwarranted, competitive disadvantage due to an increase in its costs. At
worst, the disfavored purchaser may be extinguished, but it may also
simply suffer from being forced to incur searching and switching costs"
that cause it to alter the mix of products it sells, thus reducing output and
limiting consumers' choices.'72 Under the Supreme Court's decision in
NCAA and the FTC's decision in Polygram, the courts should find such
conduct "naked" and "inherently suspect," and they should preclude it
without any consideration of the defendant's market power.'73
Although disadvantaged dealers will not have to prove market
power, they will still have a substantial burden of proof in induced
discrimination cases. Since dealers will have to prove a conspiracy,
causation and competitive injury, the benefit of the doubt will remain
with suppliers. This approach is appropriate because only in rare cases
will dealers possess sufficient market power to induce a manufacturer to
discriminate against a reseller it otherwise would have left undisturbed.'74
A manufacturer is not likely to discriminate against a reseller that is
effectively promoting its products and serving its customers. Indeed, the
manufacturer cannot afford to adopt reseller discrimination policies that
limit its competitiveness in competing against other brands: if the
manufacturer "blunders and does adopt such a policy, market retribution
will be swift."'75 Since the manufacturer is the best judge of the most
efficient way to distribute its products, the courts generally should not
second-guess its decisions on discriminating against resellers. Placing
manufacturers at undue risk of litigation costs and treble damage liability
for such discrimination will only deter them from implementing and
enforcing pro-competitive vertical restrictions and may, in fact,
172. Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and the Fate of Morton Salt: To Save It,
Let It Go, 48 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1122-23, 1124 (1999).
173. See supra Part III.D.
174. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
175. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Imps., Ltd., 678 F.2d 742,745 (7th Cir. 1982).
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encourage them to vertically integrate.'76
C. PROOF OF A CONSPIRACY
Induced discrimination can only be illegal under the statutory
language of Section i of the Sherman Act if it is effected pursuant to a
"contract, combination.., or conspiracy" between a buyer and a
supplier."'1 In order for a conspiracy to exist, the buyer and supplier must
have a mutual commitment to a common course of action.' 75 The courts
should only conclude that a buyer participated in an illegal conspiracy
when there is a meeting of the minds between a buyer and a supplier on
the need to discriminate against a rival buyer. There would have to be
some demand from the buyer, either express or implied, that the supplier
take a discriminatory action against a competitor of the buyer, and the
supplier would have to follow through by taking precisely the action
demanded by the buyer.
Courts can easily infer a conspiracy when a supplier terminates a
buyer at the instigation of a rival. In Sharp, for example, the existence of
an agreement was clear. The buyer threatened to discontinue purchasing
from the seller unless it ceased doing business with the plaintiff, and
shortly thereafter the supplier acceded to the buyer's demands.'79 The
existence of a conspiracy should also be clear when a buyer demands that
a supplier use other means of excluding a rival from the relevant market
and the supplier adopts the means demanded by the buyer. For example,
instead of terminating a dealer, a supplier may simply respond to the
complaints of a rival by changing the dealer's authorized territory to a
location where it cannot compete with the complaining buyer.
It should not be as easy for the courts to infer a conspiracy in cases
where buyers allegedly induce suppliers to discriminate in the prices
charged to a rival. Under normal circumstances, a buyer cannot
determine the discounts that its supplier provides to third parties. It
would be unfair to make a buyer liable for a supplier's failure to make a
176. In its most recent antitrust case. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, the Supreme Court emphasized that the courts should not deter firms from "risk taking
that produces innovation and economic growth." 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). Thus, in Sherman Act
cases, courts should defer to manufacturers' judgment about how to deal with customers. "[A]s a
general matter, the Sherman Act 'does not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."' Id. at 4o8 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300,307 (919)).
177. I5 U.S.C. § 1 (2ooo).
178. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Distributor Terminations Pursuant to Conspiracies Among a
Supplier and Complaining Distributors: A Suggested Antitrust Analysis, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 297, 322
(1982) ("[f1 the supplier terminates the offending distributors following the receipt of... complaints,
the fact-finder should be able to infer that the supplier and complaining distributor were mutually
committed to the termination.").
179. See supra notes 54-6o and accompanying text
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discount generally available to all buyers. The courts must protect buyers
from liability for discriminatory pricing over which they have no control.
Thus, under the proposed approach, a buyer could not be liable unless it
took some affirmative step to insure that a supplier discriminated against
its rivals. In order to prevail on the conspiracy issue, it would not be
sufficient for a plaintiff merely to allege that a buyer requested a lower
price for itself.'; The plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the buyer
also demanded, explicitly or implicitly, that the supplier preclude its
rivals from taking advantage of the lower price. Under such
circumstances, the courts could conclude that, when a supplier followed
through and discriminated in the prices charged to its customers, it was
doing so in response to the demands of the complaining buyer.
Critics of this approach may argue that it is difficult to determine
whether a buyer is attempting to induce a supplier to discriminate against
a rival or whether it is simply negotiating a better price for itself. Judges
and juries, however, are adept at determining the purpose and
motivation of defendants' conduct. Every day fact-finders are expected
to apportion liability based on the purpose of defendants' behavior in
contract, tort, employment, and criminal disputes.' The courts
traditionally have recognized that "motive and intent play leading roles"
in antitrust cases.18' As Justice Stevens, citing this Author, stated in his
dissent in Sharp, "in antitrust, as in many other areas of the law,
motivation matters and factfinders are able to distinguish bad from good
intent." '83 The courts should be able to identify those cases in which a
buyer implicitly requests a supplier to discriminate in price against a
rival. For example, the price demanded by the buyer may be so low that
the buyer would have to know that the supplier could not afford to make
the price available to other buyers. A buyer should be deemed to have
such knowledge whenever it demands a price that is equal to or less than
18o. Under the proposed approach, a buyer's demand for a lower price could constitute an illegal
type of monopsony pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, even if there was no proof of a buyer's
intent to force a supplier to discriminate against a rival. In Section 2 cases, there is no requirement for
a conspiracy between the buyer and supplier; the buyer's unilateral conduct in demanding the lower
price would be sufficient. In such a case, however, the plaintiff would have the burden of proving,
among other things, that the buyer possessed monopsony power: i.e., that it controlled more than fifty
percent of the purchases of the relevant product. For a discussion of the proposed analysis of
monopsony pricing, see Part VI, infra.
I8I. For example, courts must often determine whether employers' decisions on hiring and
promotion are made for a legitimate purpose or for an illegal discriminatory reason. See, e.g., Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246 (1989).
182. Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
183. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 754 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 6io-ii (1985); McLain v.
Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (198o); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 n.59 (i94o); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (I918);
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated Restrictions on
Distribution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. I, 4, i6-19 (1988)).
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the cost of producing the product. Nearly all buyers should be aware that
suppliers would bankrupt themselves by providing such low prices to all
their customers.
A buyer should also be deemed to have knowledge that a requested
price is discriminatory when the supplier tells the buyer that it cannot
afford to make the price available to the buyer's competitors, and yet the
buyer persists in demanding the lower price. This approach could be
criticized on the ground that it gives suppliers the ability to control a
court's determination of whether a discriminatory price is illegal.
Suppliers could arguably avoid granting legitimate discounts to
aggressive buyers simply by telling them that they cannot provide the
same discount to others and thus, the discount would be illegal. This
problem can be solved by requiring that the supplier's assertions be
made in good faith. The courts have held that suppliers can justify price
differentials in Robinson-Patman cases if they can prove that they
provided a discount with the "good faith" belief that they were meeting a
competitive offer from another supplier.'s' The courts have developed
effective standards for determining when suppliers have acted in good
faith in matching a competitive offer. 5" The courts should require similar
evidence of good faith when a disadvantaged buyer argues that its rival
induced a supplier to grant it a price that the supplier could not have
provided to other buyers. If the inducing buyer argues that it was not
aware it would be the sole recipient of the favored price, the
disadvantaged buyer can rebut the argument by demonstrating that the
supplier believed, in good faith, that it could not make the discount
generally available to its customers. The plaintiff may, for example,
introduce evidence that the supplier had refused to grant similar
discounts to other buyers in the past, or that contemporaneously with the
request from the favored buyer, personnel of the supplier documented
their inability to provide the same discount to others. In such cases, a
plaintiff might convince a fact-finder that, despite a supplier's good faith
belief that a discount was contrary to its independent interests, the
supplier buckled to the demands of a large buyer and agreed to provide
it with a unique discount.
D. PROOF OF CAUSATION
Since suppliers most often have legitimate independent reasons for
184. Section 2(b) of the Act creates a defense when the seller acts "in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor." 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (20oo). The courts have interpreted Section 2(b)
as an absolute defense to an otherwise prohibited discrimination. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,
340 U.S. 231, 251 (195).
185. In many cases, for example, suppliers have been able to prove their good faith by
documenting the existence of a bona fide competitive offer from a third party. See A.B.A. SEC.
ANTrrRusr LAW, ANrrrusr LAW DEVELOPMENrs, 482-86 (5th ed. 2002) (describing cases).
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taking adverse actions against their buyers, it is appropriate to presume
the legality of such conduct and put a heavy burden on the plaintiff to
prove that such actions were actually induced by other buyers.' 8 The
plaintiff in an induced discrimination case should be required to prove
not only that the manufacturer agreed with one or more other resellers
to effect the discrimination, but also that the only reason for the
discrimination was the reseller's desire to avoid competition. The fact
that a manufacturer and rival resellers had a mutual commitment to
discriminate against a rival does not mean that their competitive
purposes were identical. The manufacturer may have a legitimate motive
for the discrimination that is distinct from the anti-competitive motives
of a complaining reseller. A reseller's complaints may, for example, bring
to the manufacturer's attention an element of the rival reseller's
performance that would have caused the manufacturer to discriminate
against the reseller if it had learned of such facts independently. In such a
case, the agreement between the manufacturer and complaining reseller
is not the proximate cause of the disadvantaged reseller's injury and
cannot be a basis for the manufacturer's liability. Indeed, the net effect
on competition in such a case would be no different than if the supplier
and complaining reseller had never entered into an agreement.
Therefore, in order to prevail, a plaintiff should be required to prove that
the manufacturer would not have effected the relevant discriminatory
treatment "but for" the manufacturer's agreement with one or more of
the plaintiff's competitors.
The but for test insures that the courts engage in a separate analysis
of the critical issue of the supplier's motivation. Under the but for
analysis, a court can effectively determine when a supplier had business
reasons independent of a reseller's complaints to discriminate against
another reseller. The test forces the fact-finder to consider how the
supplier would have acted in the absence of the complaints. If the
supplier would have discriminated against the reseller had it learned of
the reseller's conduct independently of the complaints, the complaints
should be deemed irrelevant, and the fact-finder should not condemn the
supplier's conduct. If, however, the supplier would have not taken any
action against the reseller in the absence of the complaints, there is no
I86. However, in certain rare cases in which a supplier possesses monopoly power, it may be illegal
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for the supplier independently to change its prior pattern of
dealing with a buyer. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 408 (2004) ("Under certain circumstances, a refusal to cooperate with rivals can constitute
anticompetitive conduct and violate § 2."); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504
U.S. 45 1, 483-86 (1992) (finding that Kodak could be liable under Section 2 for refusing to continue its
prior policy of selling replacement parts to independent service organizations); Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603 (1985) (finding monopolist's refusal to deal to violate
Section 2 when "monopolist elected to make an important change in a pattern of distribution that
had.., persisted for several years").
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redeeming pro-competitive purpose that saves the conduct from
condemnation.
Two examples illustrate how the proposed approach would allow the
courts to distinguish between suppliers' independent actions and
discriminatory conduct induced by large buyers. First, consider a
hypothetical case involving Comcast Corp., which operates the largest
cable system in the Chicago area. Comcast competes for viewers with
DirecTV's satellite television system. In order to be competitive in
Chicago, both Comcast and DirecTV must carry ESPN, one of the most
popular of all cable channels.' 87 Both Comcast and DirecTV are licensed
to carry ESPN by the Walt Disney Co., which owns ESPN.' 8 Assume,
hypothetically, that Comcast has recently been losing viewers to
DirecTV, and in order to regain its competitive advantage, it demands
that Disney no longer license ESPN to DirecTV.' 8 Assume further that
Disney accedes to Comcast's request and terminates DirecTV's license
for ESPN. In a Sherman Act case, DirecTV should be able to prove that,
but for Comcast's demands, Disney would not have terminated its
relationship with DirecTV. Disney had no independent reason for taking
such action. Indeed, it was against Disney's legitimate interests to
terminate its relationship with such an important customer. The only
reason for Disney's actions was to placate Comcast, its larger customer in
Chicago.
Second, consider a hypothetical quantity discount program
implemented by Zenith Electronics Corp. ("Zenith") for television sets
purchased by all of its dealers in the United States. The program is
designed to give the largest discounts to dealers that purchase the most
televisions, and inevitably, certain small dealers will fail to qualify for the
greatest discounts. One of those small dealers ("Central Appliance")
sues Zenith under the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act,
alleging that, but for the complaints of a nearby Target store about
Central Appliance's discounting of Zenith televisions, Zenith would not
have implemented the quantity discount program. Central Appliance
claims that the Target Store convinced Zenith to favor it with a unique
discount in order to discipline Central Appliance for its price-cutting and
make it easier for the Target Store to compete against Central
Appliance. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for Central Appliance
to prevail in such an action. It strains credulity to believe that Zenith
187. See Joe Flint, Why Comcast Covets ESPN, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2004, at B i (stating that "at
present Comcast and other cable operators are reluctant to yank ESPN or other cable channels off
their systems for fear of losing subscribers to DirecTV").
i8& See id. (describing Disney's ownership of ESPN).
189. Indeed, acquiring rights to ESPN was "a prime motivation for Comcast Corp.'s unsolicited
bid" for the Walt Disney Co. in February 2004. Id. The acquisition, "[i]f successful, would.., give
Comcast some protection against satellite operator DirecTV." Id.
June 2005]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
would alter its pricing policies on a nationwide scale in order to respond
to the complaints of a single dealer. Zenith has an independent interest
in effecting pricing policies that promote the sale of the greatest number
of its televisions. In order to placate one dealer, Zenith would not be
likely to adopt a pricing policy different than that which it would have
implemented on its own. A court should thus uphold Zenith's right to
undertake such a quantity discount program. However, a court might
come to a different conclusion if a substantial number of Zenith's larger
dealers around the country had demanded that the company implement
a quantity discount program that discriminated against smaller dealers.
In such a case, Zenith could be more concerned about retaining the
goodwill of its large dealers than with maintaining its prior pricing
structure. A plaintiff might therefore convince a fact-finder that, but for
the complaints of many of Zenith's large dealers, it would not have
proceeded with the quantity discount program.
E. PROOF OF COMPETITvE HARM
It is not enough for a plaintiff to prove that a supplier knuckled
under to the demands of a buyer to discriminate against the plaintiff. In
addition, the plaintiff must show that it suffered some competitive harm
as a result of the discrimination. A buyer that has been terminated or
forced to pay a higher price than its rivals only suffers competitive harm
when it "lacks alternative, equally low-cost sources of supply.""'
Therefore, such buyers should have to demonstrate that they had no
reasonable alternative source for the product at a price comparable to
that received by the inducing buyer. If a comparable product is available
at similar terms from other suppliers, the disfavored buyer should be
required to mitigate its damages by buying from such sellers.
Buyers alleging induced price discrimination should also have to
prove that the relevant price differential was substantial enough to put
them at a competitive disadvantage. The price differential may be so
small that it has no bearing on a buyer's ability to compete in the resale
market. Since profit margins in most retail businesses are low, 9' it should
be sufficient for a plaintiff to demonstrate that it was forced to purchase
the relevant product at a price at least five percent higher than the price
available to the inducing buyer.
Requiring proof of such competitive harm in induced price
discrimination cases would reconcile the standards of liability under the
Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts. No longer would plaintiffs have a
unique cause of action under the Robinson-Patman Act that allowed for
19o. Gavil, supra note 172, at IO68.
191. See Kroger Co. v. F.T.C., 438 F.2d 1372, 1379 (6th Cir. 197) (stating that "in the retail food
business competition is keen and profit margins are low").
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recovery even when there was no evidence of harm to competition in the
relevant market.'92 Regardless of whether plaintiffs brought their claims
under the Sherman or Robinson-Patman Act, they would have to prove
that they were competitively disadvantaged as a result of a price
discrimination induced by a larger rival.'93
F. DISPENSING WITH PROOF OF MARKET POWER AND OTHER
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Once a plaintiff has proven that a rival caused a supplier to
discriminate against it, and that it was competitively harmed as a result of
the discrimination, the plaintiff should not have to prove the market
power of the supplier or the inducing buyer. It is, in fact, reasonable for
the courts to presume that the parties to an induced discrimination
conspiracy (i.e., the supplier and inducing buyer) possess market power.
After a plaintiff demonstrates that a rival buyer induced the
discrimination, it will be clear that the buyer had enough market power
to force the supplier to take an action against its legitimate self-interest.
If the plaintiff proves that it has no reasonable alternative source for the
product, it will have also introduced sufficient evidence of the supplier's
market power.
A plaintiff should not have to prove its own market power in order
to prevail in a case of induced discrimination. An induced discrimination
should be illegal even if the plaintiff has a small share of the relevant
market. Indeed, it is the small, entrepreneurial dealer who is most likely
to be the target of induced discrimination conspiracies. Such
entrepreneurs may be price-cutters or innovators, and thus may
constitute the greatest competitive threat to other buyers, and the
greatest impetus to their efficiency. By eliminating such a firm from the
market, or substantially disadvantaging the firm on pricing, larger, more
established buyers can avoid having to lower their prices, improve their
192. For a discussion of the unique cause of action currently available to plaintiffs in Robinson-
Patman cases, see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
193. Many commentators believe that the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act reveals
that its purpose was consistent with the Sherman Act. Herbert Hovenkamp has argued that Congress
was concerned in the Robinson-Patman Act with the exercise of significant market power by buyers,
and not with a seller that on its own initiative discriminates "among its small and miscellaneous
buyers." Hovenkamp, supra note 162, at 141. Indeed, the Act expressly requires that a buyer
"knowingly" receive the benefits of a price discrimination. Hovenkamp believes that this language was
"clearly intended" to limit Robinson-Patman violations to "price discriminations induced by powerful
buyers." id. at 142. Hovenkamp asserts that the courts therefore should not apply the Robinson-
Patman Act to quantity discounts or other pricing programs designed by sellers for their own
legitimate purposes. Id. at 143 ("The courts have taken a piece of legislation that was anticompetitive
enough and made it even more anticompetitive by ignoring its principal concern (large buyer power)
and its limiting language."). Instead, the Act should apply when a large buyer is able to induce a seller
to engage in a type of price discrimination it would not otherwise have considered. Such conduct
injures "both rival buyers and ultimately, the seller forced to make the discrimination." Id. at 141.
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services, or engage in other conduct beneficial to consumers.
Some commentators have argued that the courts should undertake a
market analysis in induced discrimination cases, in order to confirm that
the injured buyer's removal from the market adversely affected
consumers in some manner. John Lopatka and William Page assert that
eliminating a single competitor from the market "will not harm
competition when a significant number of comparable competitors
remain uninjured."' 94 A court following such a view could not find an
induced discrimination illegal until after it had determined the scope of
the relevant resale market, the number of resellers therein, and their
respective market shares. There is, however, no reason for fact-finders to
undertake a complicated market analysis in induced discrimination cases.
Since there are no legitimate efficiency justifications for induced
discrimination,' 5 the courts need not fear that they are deterring pro-
competitive conduct when they dispense with a market power analysis.
On the other hand, conduct harmful to consumers could escape liability
if plaintiffs had to prove defendants' market power.' 9
The proposed approach recognizes that consumers are harmed when
single firms are excluded from retail markets or are forced to pay higher
costs as a result of demands from their rivals. Such conduct deprives
consumers of a potential source of products and services and conflicts
with the antitrust laws' goal of insuring the widest range of alternatives
for American consumers.'97 Eliminating a single retailer may deprive
194. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, 69
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 367,390 (2OO1).
195. See supra notes 64-66, 172-74, and accompanying text.
196. As one commentator has explained,
Difficulties of proof mean that many instances of market power would go unproven and,
thus, that anti-competitive agreements would escape antitrust condemnation. There is no
need to bear the cost of such false negatives with respect to exclusionary agreements for
which there is no plausible efficiency justification.
A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Vertical Agreements, Address Before the American Bar
Association, Antitrust Section (Apr. 2, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
1623.htm.
197. Several courts have held that the antitrust laws were designed, among other things, to protect
consumers' ability to choose from among alternative suppliers of products and services. See FTC v.
Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (invalidating an agreement that limits "consumer
choice by impeding the 'ordinary give and take of the marketplace'") (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,692 (1978)); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 102 (1984) (stating that conduct is deemed pro-competitive where the defendant's "actions widen
consumer choice"); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 36o (7th Cir. 199o) (finding illegal a group
boycott that "interfere[s] with the consumer's free choice to take the product of his liking").
Robert Lande has pointed out that "consumers want many things from the economy, in addition
to competitively priced goods, including optimal levels of quality, variety, and safety." Robert H.
Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed to Protect Consumers (Not Just to
Increase Efficiency), 5o HASTINGS L.J. 959, 962-63 (I999). "The antitrust laws are intended to ensure
that the marketplace remains competitive so that worthwhile options are produced and made available
to consumers, and this range of options is not to be significantly impaired or distorted by anti-
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consumers of an innovative type of service not available from other retail
outlets.' 8 Wal-Mart, for example, may convince a manufacturer of
television sets to stop dealing with a small electronics store that provides
more complete customer service than Wal-Mart. Consumers may also
suffer when small retailers are forced to pay prices more than five
percent higher than those offered to their larger rivals. Ultimately, such
price discrimination may force a small retailer out of business. In any
event, the small retailer will be faced with a decline in its profit margins,
which may force it to reduce its level of services to customers.
G. INDUCED DISCRIMINATION EXAMPLES
Three examples illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach
in identifying cases in which buyers illegally induce suppliers to
discriminate against their rivals.
First, consider a case in which Zenith is supplying flat-screen
televisions to a Wal-Mart store located in the suburbs of Canton, Ohio.
Zenith also sells televisions to a small electronics store in downtown
Canton ("Jean's TV"), which has been in the same location and has
purchased televisions from Zenith for the last 25 years. Zenith is the only
source of Zenith flat-screen televisions for Wal-Mart and Jean's TV.
Jean's TV has provided customers with a high level of service at its store
and with repair services at consumers' homes. Wal-Mart demands that
Zenith begin selling flat-screen televisions to it at a price ten percent
below the price available to Jean's TV. Wal-Mart informs Zenith that it
will discontinue buying televisions from Zenith if it fails to provide Wal-
Mart with the discount. Zenith acquiesces to these demands and sells
flat-screen televisions to Wal-Mart at a price ten percent less than that
available to Jean's TV. Jean's TV brings an antitrust action against
Zenith and Wal-Mart, alleging that their agreement constitutes an illegal
restraint of trade under Section i of the Sherman Act and an illegal form
of price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act.
Under the approach proposed in this Article, Jean's TV should
prevail in its Section i and Robinson-Patman claims. Jean's TV should
be able to meet its burden of proving a conspiracy, causation, and
competitive harm. Wal-Mart's demand for a discriminatory price and
Zenith's acquiescence demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy between
the two parties. Jean's TV should also be able to demonstrate that, but
for Wal-Mart's threat to cease doing business with Zenith, Zenith would
not have charged Jean's TV a discriminatory price. Although it was
competitive practices." Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U.
PITr. L. REV. 503,503 (2oo ).
19& See Thomas B. Leary, Freedom as the Core Value of Antitrust in the New Millennium, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 545, 555 (2O00) ("Quality improvements and innovation are currently recognized as a
positive consequence of competition .... ).
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against Zenith's independent interest to discriminate against a store with
which it has such a long relationship, Zenith could not afford to ignore
the demands of a customer as large as Wal-Mart. As one commentator
has explained, "those who want to have a good relationship with Wal-
Mart have to be diplomatic; with $256 billion in sales last year, the
company has unprecedented power and offers a chance for big sales that
manufacturers cannot ignore."'" Finally, Jean's TV should be able to
prove that it was competitively harmed as a result of the price differential
induced by Wal-Mart. The ten percent premium charged Jean's TV
would be a significant disadvantage in the retail market, where profit
margins are slim.2" Indeed, the price differential could make the
difference between a profit and a loss for Jean's TV on the sale of Zenith
televisions. Furthermore, Zenith was the only source from which Jean's
TV could obtain Zenith televisions. Thus Jean's TV could not mitigate is
damages by turning to another manufacturer that could provide Zenith
flat-screen televisions at a comparable price.
Jean's TV should be able to prevail in its Section i and Robinson-
Patman actions without proving the market power of Zenith or of Wal-
Mart. Wal-Mart's demands, and Zenith's acquiescence, make it clear that
Wal-Mart misused its market power to disadvantage a rival. Zenith's
market power is not relevant because Jean's TV cannot purchase Zenith
televisions from any other source at a comparable price. The courts
should preclude Wal-Mart's conduct because it threatens consumer
welfare without any offsetting efficiency justification. As a result of the
higher price it is forced to pay to Zenith, Jean's TV may not be able to
compete as effectively with Wal-Mart, and it may lose sales and profits to
its rival. Those losses may force Jean's TV to reduce its in-store service
and home repair services or ultimately go out of business, in either case
depriving Canton consumers of an alternative to Wal-Mart. The adverse
effect on local consumers justifies a finding of liability, even though
Jean's TV is a small store that lacks market power in the retail television
market.
Second, consider a General Motors dealer in the Detroit suburbs
("5-Mile Chevrolet"), whose business has been declining for several
years due to service problems. A nearby General Motors dealer ("8-Mile
Chevrolet") has been receiving complaints from customers who have
decided to stop patronizing 5-Mile Chevrolet because of its service
problems. 8-Mile Chevrolet informs General Motors of the complaints
and suggests that it may wish to consider revoking 5-Mile Chevrolet's
franchise. General Motors investigates the situation and decides to
199. Anne D'Innocenzio, Toys Makers Boost Toys R Us, Shun Wal-Mart, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER,
Feb. 15, 2004, at Gi.
200. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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terminate 5-Mile Chevrolet as a dealer. Under these circumstances, 5-
Mile Chevrolet should not be able to prevail in a Section i action against
General Motors and 8-Mile Chevrolet. Although General Motors and 8-
Mile Chevrolet may have shared a common commitment to effect 5-Mile
Chevrolet's termination, 5-Mile Chevrolet could not meet its burden of
proving that 8-Mile Chevrolet's complaints caused its termination. The
poor service provided by 5-Mile Chevrolet gave General Motors its own
independent reason to terminate the dealer. By removing a poorly
performing dealer, General Motors enhances its effectiveness in
competing against other automobile manufacturers. Thus the plaintiff's
burden of proving causation would protect General Motors against any
liability for its own pro-competitive actions.
Finally, consider a case in which a grocery store ("Dave's Grocery")
purchases bread from a small bakery ("Frank's Bakery") that also sells
bread to a neighboring convenience store ("Al's Food Mart"). Frank's
Bakery is one of many bakeries in the area that provide bread to retail
groceries at comparable prices. Dave's Grocery demands that Frank's
Bakery sell bread exclusively to it and stop doing business with Al's Food
Mart. Although Frank's Bakery would prefer to continue to sell to both
stores, it stops selling to Al's Food Mart because it fears losing business
from Dave's Grocery. In a Section I case, Al's Food Mart should be able
to prove that Dave's Grocery caused Frank's Bakery to stop selling
bread to it. However, Al's Food Mart should not be able to prove that it
was competitively harmed as a result of the actions of Dave's Grocery.
Al's Food Mart could easily replace Frank's Bakery as a supplier with
one of many other local bakeries that provide bread at a comparable
price. Thus consumers would not be deprived of an alternative source of
bread, and there would be no need for the courts to preclude the conduct
of Dave's Grocery.
VI. APPLYING THE NEW APPROACH TO MONOPSONY PRICING
A. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN PERMISSIBLE AND ILLEGAL
PRICE NEGOTIATIONS
Monopsony pricing is more likely to benefit than to harm
consumers. Aggressive bargaining by monopsonists often results in an
immediate reduction of consumer prices, as buyers pass on their lower
costs to their customers. Courts must not diminish large buyers' incentive
to engage in such conduct. Indeed, if the courts become too aggressive in
regulating monopsony pricing, they will chill aggressive competition at
the resale level and reward those buyers that are less efficient in reducing
their costs. Thus, most courts have appropriately given large buyers wide
latitude to negotiate lower prices, pointing out the beneficial effect of
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such conduct on consumers." '
In cases brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the courts
have made it clear that it should not be illegal for a firm to obtain
monopoly power. Such power often reflects a firm's superior ability to
provide consumers with the best products at the lowest possible prices. °2
In order to violate Section 2, a defendant must not only possess
monopoly power; it must also misuse that power for an anti-competitive
purpose."° As the Supreme Court stated in Verizon Communications,
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, its most recent Section 2
case, "[t]o safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of
monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by
an element of anticompetitive conduct.""°4 Antitrust regulators have
analogized monopsony conduct by buyers to sellers' monopoly conduct,
stating that the economic effects of both types of conduct can be
similar. 5 Thus, just as it is not illegal for a seller to obtain monopoly
power, it also should not be illegal for a buyer to obtain monopsony
power. Buyers, like sellers, most often earn their market power by being
the most efficient competitors in the relevant market. Wal-Mart, for
example, dominates retail markets because it has been able to keep its
costs to a minimum through innovative information management and
distribution systems and has been willing to pass along the benefit of
those lower costs to its customers.' Wal-Mart's market power at the
retail level has only increased because the company has made itself a
place where customers prefer to shop.
Monopsony power, like monopoly power, becomes a problem only
when firms use that power for anti-competitive purposes. A monopolist
is permitted to engage in conduct that results naturally from its market
power, such as unilaterally restricting output or preventing entry by
"pricing above its own costs but just below the estimated costs of its next
most efficient rivals."2" Similarly, a monopsonist should be able to
2oi. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text
202. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) ("A single
producer may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior
skill, foresight and industry .... [T]he Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very
forces which it is its prime object to foster .... The successful competitor, having been urged to
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.").
203. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (finding that offense of
monopolization has two elements: (i) "possession of monopoly power," and (2) "the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident"); Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping
Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, iii YALE L.J. 941, 950 (2002) ("A firm must do something bad to
violate section 2.").
204. 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
205. See supra note 76.
206. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
207. Leary, supra note 198, at 548.
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pursue conduct that is a natural consequence of its market power, such as
the negotiation of lower prices 8
Monopolists violate Section 2 when they pursue conduct that allows
them to retain or gain monopoly power "through some exclusionary
device other than competition on the merits."' '° Monopsonists should
also be liable under Section 2 when they misuse their market power.
Peter Hammer and William Sage recently explained, "To establish a
Section 2 violation, just as in the case of a monopoly, a plaintiff must
show not only monopsony power but monopsony conduct.".. Antitrust
textbooks describe the theoretical illegality of monopsony pricing under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, emphasizing its adverse welfare effects,
such as a reduction in output of the relevant product."' In no cases,
however, have the courts been able to develop an effective means of
distinguishing between the permissible and illegal negotiating conduct of
large buyers. The new approach proposed in this Article will clarify the
circumstances under which monopolists misuse their market power while
continuing to encourage large buyers to reduce their input costs and pass
along the benefits of such cost reductions to consumers.
Because monopsony pricing negotiations are more capable of
promoting than of harming consumer welfare, the courts should place
the greatest burden of proof on plaintiffs in monopsony pricing cases. A
supplier should not be able to prevail in a monopsony pricing case unless
it can prove (I) that a buyer controls a large enough portion of the
purchases of the relevant product to possess monopsony power, (2) that
the buyer has exercised its monopsony power to reduce purchase prices
in the market substantially below the normal competitive level, and (3)
that the price reduction had the potential to harm competition in the
market for the relevant product. Furthermore, even if a supplier makes a
prima facie case of competitive harm from monopsony pricing, a
monopsonist should be able to rebut such evidence by demonstrating
that it passed on the benefit of its lower input prices to consumers. In
such a case, the benefit to consumers would outweigh any adverse
competitive effect caused by the lower prices received by a supplier.
B. PROVING A BUYER'S MONOPSONY POWER
Monopsony power constitutes "the ability of a buyer to reduce the
price of a purchased item.., below the competitive level by restricting its
purchases of the item ..... A buyer could not have such a significant effect
208. See Naughton, supra note i, at 81 ("Just as is the case with monopoly power, the mere
possession of monopsony power and charging of a monopsony price is not illegal.") (citation omitted).
209. See Edlin, supra note 203, at 952.
21o. Hammer & Sage, supra note 15, at 957.
211. See, e.g., A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST LAW, ANTrrRusT LAW DEVELOPMENTS 232 (5th ed. 2002).
212. Jacobson & Dorman, Purchasing, supra note 14, at 5.
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on the market price of a product unless it controlled a substantial
percentage of all the purchases of the product. 3 There is no consensus
on a threshold level at which monopsony power should be presumed.
The Department of Justice has selected a thirty-five percent market
share as the minimum threshold level for challenges to buyer conduct."1 4
A 1962 study of monopsony power in the natural gas pipeline industry
concluded that monopsony power almost never exists when the market
share of an individual buyer, or a group of buyers, is less than fifty
percent."5 Two commentators have argued that a fifty percent share of
purchases in the relevant market is a reasonable minimum threshold216
The courts should presume that any firm which controls more than
fifty percent of the purchases of a particular product possesses
monopsony power. No supplier could afford to ignore the demands of a
buyer that controls such a significant share of the market. If, for example,
General Motors purchased more than fifty percent of the U.S. output of
a particular type of steel, the supplier of that steel could be forced to
accept a below-market price in order to retain General Motors' business.
The fifty percent threshold is high enough to protect price negotiations
by most buyers from any antitrust regulation at all. As Jonathon
Jacobson and Gary Dorman have concluded, "buyer concentration is
generally much lower than seller concentration across U.S. markets.....7 It
would be unusual, indeed, for an individual buyer to purchase more than
fifty percent of the entire U.S. output of a particular product."I
However, it is not only individual firms that can possess monopsony
power. A group of buyers may form a purchasing cooperative to buy
products on their behalf. If the buyers integrate their purchasing
functions in the joint venture, that venture should be regarded as a single
entity when it acts within the scope of its business purpose and attempts
213. See id. at to ("In order to exert monopsony power, the firm's purchases must be large enough
to have a significant effect on the market price.").
214. See Charles F. Rule, The Antitrust Division's Approach to Shippers' Associations, Speech
Before the Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n (Oct. 21, 1985), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/speeches/2163.htm. If the thirty-five percent threshold is exceeded, the Department of
Justice will "examine other structural and performance characteristics of the industry involved to
determine whether other factors eliminate any competitive concerns .. " Id. The Department of
Justice, however, has not explained what those characteristics are or the weight they should be
afforded.
215. Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 14, at 59.
216. Id.
217. Id. at it.
218. Rarely, if ever, would a single buyer possess monopsony power in markets for indirect goods
(such as maintenance, repair or overhaul items) purchased by many other buyers. For example, if all
the steel producers in the United States combined their purchases of paper, they would not possess




to negotiate more favorable purchase prices for its members."9 In
determining the market power of such a cooperative, the courts should
aggregate the market share of its members. If members controlling more
than fifty percent of the purchases of the relevant product join the
cooperative, it should be deemed to be a monopsonist. Such an
organization has just as much ability to bargain for a lower price as a
single firm with monopsony power. Indeed, because they aggregate the
market power of their members, purchasing joint ventures are more
likely than individual firms to possess monopsony power.
C. PROVING A BUYER'S MISUSE OF MONOPSONY POWER
Once a plaintiff has proven that a single buyer or a purchasing
cooperative possesses monopsony power, it must demonstrate that the
buying entity has misused its monopsony power to reduce its purchase
prices below the normal competitive level. It will be important for the
courts precisely to define the threshold at which purchase prices will be
deemed to have declined below the normal level. The courts have
developed a clear threshold for defining predatory pricing levels in
Section 2 monopolization cases. A plaintiff cannot prevail in such cases
unless it can prove that a supplier sold a product at a price below its
marginal costs of production. Courts have presumed that below-cost
sales by monopolists are designed to discourage new entrants or to drive
219. If, on the other hand, the buyers simply coordinated their purchasing activities and did not
integrate their operations in any manner, their joint negotiation of purchase prices would be
considered an illegal buying cartel under the proposed approach. See supra notes 136-40 and
accompanying text.
220. See Clare Ansberry, Let's Build an Online Supply Network., WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2000, at BI
(describing separate ventures among eleven retailers, major automobile suppliers, medical product
companies, consumer products manufacturers, and automobile manufacturers). Competitors in several
industries have recently formed Internet-based "B2B" purchasing joint ventures. Many suppliers fear
that the auctions that will be conducted by the new B2B purchasing joint ventures will unduly reduce,
or entirely eliminate, their profit margins. See Jeffrey Ball et al., Parts Suppliers Worry About Impact
of Centralized System's Effect on Profits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at Ai (stating that a recent
auction "saw price reductions of io% for tires and 40% for rubber hoses-terrifying numbers in an
industry where profit margins rarely make it out of the single digits"). As an automobile analyst
recently explained, "These online auctions are really going to squeeze the margins of some suppliers
who can't afford to be squeezed." Id. (quoting Rod Lache, automobile analyst for Deutsche Banc
Alex. Brown).
Purchasing B2Bs may, in fact, be in a unique position to exercise monopsony power. In its
investigation of the B2B purchasing joint venture among the Big Three automobile companies, the
Federal Trade Commission was "especially concerned about monopsony or oligopsony, in which one
or many major purchasers band together to squeeze suppliers and force down their prices." John R.
Wilke, Green Light is Likely for Auto-Parts Site, WALL ST. J., Sept. II, 2000, at A3. Through its
information-sharing practices, a B2B can effectively coordinate its members' decisions on the prices to
be paid for certain products. See FTC, ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE
WORLD OF B2B ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACES, Oct. 2000, Part 3, at 13-16, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2ooo/olb26report.pdf (voicing concern over such coordination).
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small "foot-hold" competitors from the market."'
In monopsony cases, however, plaintiffs should not be required to
prove that a buyer forced a supplier to price below its costs. A below-cost
pricing standard is appropriate in Section 2 monopolization cases
because the pricing at issue originates with suppliers. When acting on
their own, suppliers have no rational reason to reduce their prices below
the normal competitive level, thereby limiting their profit margins. It is
therefore reasonable to presume that suppliers are responding to normal
market demands and to place a heavy burden on plaintiffs to
demonstrate that a price reduction was actually intended to drive current
competitors from the market or discourage entry by a new competitor. A
supplier's incentives, however, are completely different when a
monopsonist attempts to induce a price reduction. In such a case, a
supplier has a rational reason to reduce its prices: its need to retain the
business of its largest customer. Indeed, a supplier's most rational
response to a monopsonist's demand for a price break is to reduce its
prices below the prevailing competitive level but above its marginal
costs. Such a response will preserve the supplier's business with the
monopsonist while insuring that it makes some profit on the sale.
In a monopsony pricing case, therefore, a supplier should not have
to prove that a monopsonist demanded that prices be reduced below the
supplier's costs. It should be sufficient for the supplier to demonstrate
that the monopsonist required it to reduce its prices by some substantial
increment that was below the current competitive level.22 It should not
be difficult for the courts to establish, through the parties' course of
dealing, the prevailing competitive price for the relevant product. The
courts can further simplify the analysis by defining a precise threshold for
prices that will be deemed too far below the established competitive
level. It would be reasonable for the courts to set such a threshold at ten
221. Most courts have adopted the "Areeda-Turner" test to determine when a defendant's price is
below cost, and thus illegal. The test, first described by Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner in a 1975
article in the Harvard Law Review, requires that a plaintiff prove that a defendant's prices are below
its marginal cost of producing the relevant product. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. Rev. 697, 711-12 (1975).
For an example of a decision applying the Areeda-Turner approach, see Cal. Computer Prods., Inc. v.
IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 743 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that IBM did not engage in predatory pricing
when it sold products at a level above marginal cost).
222. This approach should apply regardless of whether a monopsonist negotiates a price reduction
with one or several suppliers. The courts should not infer a per se illegal price-fixing arrangement at
the supplier level merely because the monopsonist demands the same price from a group of buyers. In
such a case, the suppliers would not be conspiring among themselves to fix prices; they would merely
be responding independently to a buyer's pricing demands. Indeed, there is no rational economic
reason for the suppliers to agree among themselves to keep prices artificially low. See Med. Arts
Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 518 F. Supp. I100, 1107 (D.
Conn. i981) (rejecting application of per se rule to limits set by Blue Cross medical plan on amounts it
would reimburse pharmacies for prescription drugs).
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percent below the prevailing price level. This standard would protect
consumers by allowing normal price reductions that occur in the ordinary
give-and-take of the marketplace. However, the threshold would also
insure that monopsonists could not use their market power to force
suppliers to deal with them on unreasonable terms.
Such an approach to monopsony pricing would be controversial.
Courts and commentators are likely to argue that the approach puts
judges and juries in the position of regulating prices, a task for which
they have no expertise.'23 There are several answers to such criticisms.
First, the proposed approach, with its ten percent threshold, would be
easy for the courts to apply. Fact-finders would not have to engage in any
complicated economic calculations to determine whether a monopsonist
had forced a supplier to reduce its prices by such an amount. Secondly,
the approach would apply only in those unusual circumstances in which a
buyer controlled more than fifty percent of the purchases of the relevant
product and used that market power to force a significantly lower price.
Finally, there is precedent for regulating the pricing activities of the rare
firms that possess such substantial market power.
A long line of cases in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have required entities controlling "essential facilities" to allow all
qualified parties to use the facilities on reasonable terms. The courts
have concluded that, without guaranteed access to such facilities, firms
would be unable to compete in the relevant market, and they have
required defendants to insure that all eligible parties can use such
facilities upon reasonable and equal terms. For example, in United States
v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis,"4 a group of fourteen
railroads owned a joint venture that controlled the only means of access
to bridges crossing the Mississippi River at St. Louis. The railroads had
refused to allow their competitors to use the bridges at a reasonable
price. The Court ordered the railroads to allow their competitors to
access the bridges "upon such just and reasonable terms as shall
place [the competitors] upon a plane of equality in respect of benefits
and burdens" with the owners of the association."5 The courts have
extended the essential facilities doctrine to a variety of industries and
resources, including the New York Stock Exchange, the Associated
Press, AT&T's telephone network, and standards-setting organizations.
223. See John E. Lopatka, Solving the Oligopoly Problem: Turner's Try, 41 AN-nTRUST BULL. 843,
9o6 (1996) (arguing that rules prohibiting certain parallel pricing among competitors, "even if they
would not compel defendants to act irrationally, would nevertheless require the unacceptable-that
courts act like rate regulators").
224. 224 U.S. 383,397-98 (i912).
225. Id. at 411.
226. See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 347-48 (1963) (covering a private wire network
among New York Stock Exchange members); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,
June 2005]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Access to such essential facilities is no less critical than a supplier's ability
to continue to sell to a monopsonist, who will, by definition, be the
largest single purchaser of its products. A buyer that controls more than
fifty percent of the demand for a particular product possesses an
essential resource: the largest single outlet for sales of a supplier's
product. Such a buyer can exclude a supplier from the relevant market
simply by refusing to buy from it. Thus, buyers with monopsony power,
like the defendants in the essential facilities cases, should be deemed to
have a corresponding duty to deal with all eligible suppliers on
reasonable terms. This duty would include agreeing to purchase from
suppliers at prices no more than ten percent below the prevailing
competitive price.
D. PROVING COMPETITIVE HARM IN THE RELEVANT MARKET
As aggressive price negotiations by a monopsonist are more capable
of benefiting than harming consumers, suppliers in monopsony pricing
cases should have the burden of proving that the price reduction
demanded by a monopsonist actually could harm competition in the
market for the relevant product. Some harm to a supplier will be evident
from its proof that it was forced to sell to a monopsonist at a price more
than ten percent below the normal competitive level. Such a supplier will
suffer a significant decline in profit margins on sales to the monopsonist.
However, in order to prove that its viability as a competitor was
diminished, the supplier should have to demonstrate that it will continue
to lose profits for a significant period of time. In such a case, the buyer's
conduct would have economic effects detrimental to consumers. If the
price reduction continued for a substantial period, the supplier may be
unable to invest in new products or services or in more efficient means of
production. Eventually, the supplier may be forced to discontinue
production of the relevant product, thereby reducing the alternatives
available to consumers.
A supplier should be able to meet its burden of proving the
persistence of a below-market price by demonstrating that it cannot
make up its lost profits by increasing sales of the relevant product at
competitive prices, either to other existing buyers or to new buyers that
364 U.S. 656, 659-60 (i96I) (covering seals of approval granted by industry standards-setting
organization); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 13-14 (945) (covering the news-
gathering services of the Associated Press); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d Io8I,
1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983) (covering monopoly telephone network).
In a recent case, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398 (2004), the Supreme Court limited the scope of the essential facilities doctrine, finding that
Verizon could not be compelled to allow AT&T to connect its long-distance lines to Verizon's local
telephone system. The Court pointed out that the doctrine should not apply when there was already a
regulatory system in place that dictated the specific terms of access to the relevant facility. Id. at 405-
[VOL. 56:11 21
BUYERS' COMPETITIVE CONDUCT
are likely to enter the market in the near future. Because monopsonists
are always the largest current purchasers of the relevant product,
suppliers should be able to prove, in most cases, that they cannot replace
the sales lost to the monopsonist with sales to other buyers. In a few
cases, however, a defendant may be able to demonstrate that a supplier
did have other viable options. Although a monopsonist will be the largest
purchaser of the relevant product in the market as a whole, it is possible
that the monopsonist will not account for a large portion of a particular
supplier's sales. A supplier may, for example, specialize in sales to
smaller niche customers. In such cases, a supplier may find it relatively
easy to substitute new sales for the below-market sales to the
monopsonist. It is also possible that new buyers may be entering the
market, or existing buyers may be expanding, who are capable of
purchasing the quantity of products bought by the monopsonist. Indeed,
if a monopsonist persists in reducing purchase prices below the normal
competitive level, it may encourage other firms to enter the market (or
existing firms to expand) to take advantage of such prices. Over time, the
additional demand for the relevant product caused by new entry may
return the price of the product to the normal competitive level."7 In such
a case, there will be no lasting competitive effects from a monopsonist's
below-market pricing demands.
In order to prove competitive harm, a supplier need not demonstrate
an over-all reduction in output in the relevant market. A court should be
able to infer sufficient harm from a supplier's need to sell a substantial
amount of product for an extended period of time at a price more than
ten percent below the normal competitive level. Indeed, in many cases, it
would be impossible for a supplier to prove that output in the relevant
market declined as a result of the lower prices negotiated by a
monopsonist. A defendant might, for example, assert that a reduction in
output was simply the consequence of a natural decline in demand for
the product prompted by normal economic conditions. Faced with such
an argument, it would be difficult for a fact-finder to determine with any
certainty the actual cause of a reduction in output in the relevant market.
E. REBUTTING A SUPPLIER'S PRIMA FACIE CASE
Most economists, antitrust commentators, and courts have
concluded that the primary goal of the antitrust laws should be to protect
227. See Jacobson & Dorran, supra note 14, at 10-1z ("[Ilf entry into the buyers' market is
sufficiently easy, then monopsony profits will quickly disappear. New firms will enter (or existing firms
will expand) and their additional purchases of the input will return its price and quantity to the
competitive level.").
228. "For example, it may be difficult to ascertain the proper measure of output, and other market
factors affecting overall supply and demand may impair the validity of a simple 'before-and-after'
analysis." Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 14, at 56.
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consumers from over-charging and to encourage firms to compete
aggressively to lower consumer prices.229 Thus, the courts need to insure
that monopsonists have a "fail-safe" means of avoiding liability when
they can demonstrate that the purpose and effect of their conduct was to
benefit consumers. Under the proposed approach, monopsonists would
be able to rebut a supplier's prima facie case by proving that they passed
along the benefit of their lower purchase costs to consumers. In such
cases, the benefit to consumers should trump any adverse effects on
suppliers forced to sell their products at below-market prices (i.e., the
adverse effect on "producer surplus" will be compensated by the gain in
"consumer surplus").23 Given the consumer welfare orientation of the
antitrust laws, the benefits of lower consumer prices should be deemed to
outweigh any competitive harm that producers suffer as a result of
monopsony pricing. 3' Thus, under the proposed approach, a
monopsonist could rebut a supplier's proof of the three elements of its
cause of action (i.e., monopsony power, below-market sales, and
competitive harm) simply by proving that it lowered prices to its
customers by a factor at least equal to the amount by which its own
purchase prices declined.
F. MONOPSONY PRICING EXAMPLES
Two examples illustrate the advantages of the proposed approach in
monopsony pricing cases. First, consider a purchasing joint venture
229. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork,
J.); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.); Valley
Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Imps., Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.); Robert H. Bork,
The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 21, 24 (1985); Frank Easterbrook,
Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696, 1703 (1986); Eleanor Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan,
Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 936,945 (1987).
230. See Hammer & Sage, supra note I5, at 968 ("A wholly defensible antitrust proposition is that
no liability should flow from [buyer] practices that demonstrably lead to lower consumer prices in the
end-market."). Some courts have referred to lower consumer prices as a rationale for permitting
monopsony pricing. See, e.g., United States v. Delta Dental of R.I., 943 F. Supp. 172, 177 (D.R.I. 1996)
(pointing out that monopsony pricing was appropriately permitted in Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass.,
Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (Ist Cir. 1984), because the monopsony pricing by Blue Shield "resulted in low
prices for Blue Shield's enrollees"). Some commentators believe, however, that monopsonists are not
likely to pass on lower prices to consumers because they have enough power in the downstream
market to maintain prices at a higher level. See, e.g., James C. Lanik, Stopping the Tailspin: Use of
Oligopolistic and Oligopsonistic Power to Produce Profits in the Airline Industry, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 509,
525 n.93 (995) ("One may be tempted to assume that because the monopsonist pays lower prices for
its inputs, it will pass those savings onto the consumer in the form of lower prices for the finished
output. This assumption does not hold because the monopsonist will price where marginal cost equals
demand, and marginal cost does not change.").
231. See Westchester Radiological Assocs. V. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 707 F. Supp.
707, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[T]o the extent that consumer welfare is the goal of antitrust, a court
should be hesitant to extend antitrust law to strike down a system that currently saves consumers
about $25 million a year in radiology fees.") (citation omitted).
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("Ore Buyer Inc.") formed by steel manufacturers that collectively
account for sixty percent of the domestic purchases of iron ore. The steel
manufacturers have combined their purchasing operations in Ore Buyer
Inc. and delegated to the joint venture complete authority to negotiate
the purchase of iron ore on their behalf. Ore Buyer Inc. demands, and
receives from Oglebay Norton Co. ("Oglebay"), a U.S. iron ore
producer, a fifteen percent reduction in the price of iron ore. There is no
evidence that the owners of Ore Buyer Inc. lowered their steel prices as a
result of their lower costs for iron ore. Oglebay sues Ore Buyer Inc. for
engaging in illegal monopsony pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. Oglebay should be able to prove the illegality of Ore Buyer Inc.'s
conduct under the proposed approach. Since the steel manufacturers
have integrated their purchasing operations in Ore Buyer Inc., the joint
venture would be treated as a single entity capable of exercising the
aggregate market power of all the manufacturers. Thus, Ore Buyer Inc.
possesses monopsony power because it controls more than fifty percent
of the domestic demand for iron ore. The fifteen percent price reduction
achieved by Ore Buyer Inc. exceeds the ten percent threshold for
proving a price below the normal competitive level. Oglebay should be
able to prove that a fifteen percent price reduction on such a large
volume of its sales adversely affected competition in the relevant market.
Since Ore Buyer Inc. purchases sixty percent of all domestic iron ore,
Oglebay should not be able to find enough current buyers to replace the
below-market sales made to Ore Buyer Inc. Furthermore, it is difficult
for new firms to enter the steel manufacturing business, where capital
costs are high.232 These high barriers to entry make it unlikely that
Oglebay will be able to find any new steel manufacturers that can replace
the iron ore sales lost to Oil Buyer Inc. Thus Oglebay should be able to
show that the artificial reduction in prices will persist for a significant
period of time and that it cannot mitigate the competitive harm by
finding new buyers for iron ore that are willing to pay a higher price.
Finally, the steel manufacturers that own Oil Buyer Inc. will not be able
to rebut Oglebay's evidence of competitive harm because they never
passed on the benefit of the lower iron ore prices to their own steel
customers.
Second, consider a case in which Wal-Mart opens a new
"superstore" grocery in a growing suburban area of Phoenix. Wal-Mart
controls fifty-one percent of the purchases of milk in the local area. Wal-
Mart receives a ten percent discount from a Phoenix dairy ("Smith's
Dairy"), all of which it passes on to its customers in lower milk prices.
Under the proposed approach, it would be difficult for Smith's Dairy to
232. See Piraino, New Approach to Mergers, supra note io8, at 840 ("Firms must invest enormous
amounts of capital to maintain integrated steel operations.").
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prevail in a monopsony pricing case against Wal-Mart. Although Wal-
Mart is a monopsonist that has exacted a below-market price, Smith's
Dairy should not be able to prove any enduring competitive harm from
Wal-Mart's conduct. Smith's Dairy should find it difficult to meet its
burden of proving that the below-market price demanded by Wal-Mart
will persist for any significant period of time. Since entry to the local
grocery market is relatively easy (as evidenced by Wal-Mart's own recent
entry), Smith's Dairy should be able to find other grocery stores willing
to pay a competitive price for milk. Wal-Mart's grocery store is located in
an area with a growing population, where other grocery stores could
enter the market, or existing stores could expand. Furthermore, even if
Smith's Dairy was able to show that entry into the grocery store market
was relatively difficult, and therefore, that it could not compensate for its
below-market sales to Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart could rebut Smith Dairy's
prima facie case of competitive harm by demonstrating that it passed
along the benefit of lower purchase prices for milk to its customers. Thus
any harm to Smith's Dairy would be offset by the benefit to consumers
from Wal-Mart's lower prices.
CONCLUSION
Given the increased market power achieved by buyers during the
last several years, it is more important than ever that the federal courts
develop an effective means of analyzing large buyers' competitive
conduct. Unfortunately, however, the courts, held hostage by the per
se/rule of reason dichotomy, have taken a confusing and inconsistent
approach to buyers' conduct. The courts' analyses have left business
executives uncertain as to the boundaries of legality for the three main
types of buyer conduct: oligopsony pricing, induced discrimination, and
monopsony pricing.
A continuum-based approach to the Sherman Act, first advocated
by this Author in i99i and adopted by the Supreme Court in California
Dental in 1999, points a way out of the federal courts' dilemma in
analyzing buyers' conduct. This Article proposes a new sliding-scale
analysis for each of the primary means by which buyers exercise their
market power. The approach appropriately deters conduct harmful to
consumers and encourages buyers to engage in conduct that benefits
consumers. The summary approach to oligopsony pricing prevents large
buyers from conspiring with their rivals to fix the prices of purchased
products, while preserving buyers' ability to form legitimate joint
ventures designed to reduce their purchasing costs. The intermediate
approach to induced discrimination places enough of a burden on
plaintiffs to insure that suppliers are not deterred from acting to
discipline dealers in ways that enhance the efficiency of their distribution
systems. At the same time, the approach gives dealers an adequate
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remedy in cases where they have been excluded from a market, or their
costs have increased, as a result of the anti-competitive conduct of their
rivals. Finally, the approach places the greatest burden of proof on
plaintiffs in monopsony pricing cases. Under the proposed approach,
large buyers cannot be liable whenever they pass on the benefit of lower
prices to consumers. Suppliers will, however, have a remedy in the rare
case in which they are forced to sell at a below-market price for a
significant period of time to a buyer that retains the advantage of the
unduly low price for itself.
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